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MUSEUMS' INITIATION OF DECLARATORY
JUDGMENT ACTIONS AND ASSERTION OF
STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS IN RESPONSE TO
NAZI-ERA ART RESTITUTION CLAIMS-A
DEFENSE
Simon J. Frankel and Ethan Forrest*
ABSTRACT
Since the reunification of Germany brought greater access to
information about the history and location of artworks that
changed hands during the Nazi era, numerous restitution claims
have been asserted to works held by U.S. museums. In a few
instances, U.S. museums faced with such claims have initiated
declaratory judgment actions seeking to quiet title to the works
and have also invoked statutes of limitations or laches to bar the
claims. Some recent commentary in law reviews and elsewhere
has faulted museums for such conduct, contending that museums
are obliged to restitute to claimants any works to which a
Holocaust-related claim has been asserted, or to litigate claims
"on the merits," without invoking so-called "technical defenses"
such as statutes of limitations or laches. This article argues that
such a view ignores the complex nature of both the claims asserted
and the fiduciary obligations of museums to protect the assets they
hold in trust and avoid unnecessary depletion of them. Any
thoughtful approach must acknowledge that each claim must be
considered on its historical merits. Some such claims are valid
and based on sound provenance research, as they involve works of
art demonstrably stolen by the Nazis and sought by the families
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and a lecturer-in-law at Stanford Law School. Ethan Forrest, a former summer
associate at Covington & Burling LLP, is a 2012 graduate of Stanford Law
School. Covington & Burling LLP was counsel for the Museum of Fine Arts,
Boston in the Museum of Fine Arts, Boston v. Seger-Thomschitz case discussed
below. The views expressed here are those of the authors only, and do not
necessarily reflect the views of Covington & Burling LLP or any of its clients.
Mr. Frankel is grateful to Jim Snipes of Covington & Burling LLP for
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from whom they were taken. Other meritorious claims might
involve works with key gaps in provenance, which, while not
directly probative, support suspicion about the circumstances
under which the original owners parted with the works-such as
an early sale by a European dealer known to sell Nazi-confiscated
artworks. However, some other claims may not appear
meritorious after careful research, such as those that involve
families who pursued restitution of some works of art after World
War II but did not pursue other works that they knew of and that
their families had parted with at some point-suggesting that the
families themselves did not believe that those works had been
wrongfully taken. In short, not all claims to recover artworks that
changed hands in the Nazi era are equal. Beyond this, museums
have fiduciary obligations not borne by private individuals who
are also good faith purchasers. Museums have both a duty to take
all reasonable steps to protect the assets they hold in trust and
ethical obligations to the claimants who assert ownership of works
long held by museums. While museums must take all Nazi-era art
restitution claims seriously, as their codes of ethics demand, a
museum may conclude after diligent research that a particular
claim is not meritorious, indicating that the museum holds good
title to the work. In such circumstances, there is no legal or
ethical bar to museums initiating litigation to quiet title to works,
and no bar to a museum taking all reasonable steps to prevail in
such litigation at minimal expense-to avoid depleting trust assets
unnecessarily-including by invoking statutes of limitations or
laches where appropriate. Notably, in the very few cases where
museums have initiated litigation to defeat claims to works in their
collections, each museum has had a strong evidentiary reason for
believing both that the claim was not meritorious and that the
claim was time-barred. In contrast, there are many more
instances where museums, faced with claims by the heirs of
Holocaust victims, have voluntarily restituted works to claimants
or amicably reached monetary settlements that allow the museums
to retain the works at issue.
280
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I. INTRODUCTION
In conjunction with the Holocaust, the Nazis carried out perhaps
the most systematic art theft in history.' The Nazis' methodical
efforts to collect artworks, and in particular to dispossess Jews of
all their belongings, has led to a plethora of claims by Holocaust
victims and their heirs to recover artworks lost during that period.2
The works that changed hands during the Nazi era have come-
often through many transfers, over many years-into the
collections of both individuals and museums, primarily in Europe
and the United States. Over the past two decades, particularly
since the reunification of Germany and the establishment of the
Washington Principles of 1998, scholars and potential claimants
have had greater access to information about artworks that
changed hands during the Nazi era, leading to more claims to
recover artworks.'
In a few instances, U.S. museums faced with such claims to
works in their collections have responded by initiating declaratory
judgment actions seeking to quiet title, and have also invoked
statutes of limitations or laches to bar the claims.' Some recent
law review commentaries, as well as private blog posts, have
found fault with such museum conduct.' These commentators-
1. See generally MICHAEL J. KURTZ, AMERICA AND THE RETURN OF NAZI
CONTRABAND: THE RECOVERY OF EUROPE'S CULTURAL TREASURES (2006);
HECTOR FELICIANO, THE LOST MUSEUM: THE NAZI CONSPIRACY TO STEAL THE
WORLD'S GREATEST WORKS OF ART (1997); LYNN H. NICHOLAS, THE RAPE OF
EUROPA: THE FATE OF EUROPE'S TREASURES IN THE THIRD REICH AND THE
SECOND WORLD WAR (1994).
2. See, e.g., Lawrence M. Kaye, Avoidance and Resolution of Cultural
Heritage Disputes: Recovery of Art Looted During the Holocaust, 14
WILLAMETTE J. INT'L L. & DiS. RES. 243, 243-56 (2006) (discussing the history
of the Holocaust art restitution movement and describing the way some
restitution claims have moved through the courts).
3. See id.
4. See id.
5. See infra § IV.A (discussing these cases).
6. E.g., Jennifer Anglim Kreder, The New Battleground of Museum Ethics
and Holocaust-Era Claims: Technicalities Trumping Justice or Responsible
Stewardship for the Public Trust?, 88 OREGON L. REv. 37, 37-47 (2009)
(arguing that museums' defense of their collections against certain Holocaust-
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particularly Jennifer Anglim Kreder and Bert Demarsin-have
suggested that museums are obliged either to restitute to claimants
any works to which a Holocaust-related claim has been asserted, or
to litigate the claim "on the merits" without invoking so-called
"technical defenses," such as statutes of limitations or laches,
which might defeat the claim at an early stage of litigation.
era art restitution claims is unethical and against U.S. policy); Jennifer Anglim
Kreder, Essay, Guarding the Historical Recordfrom the Nazi-Era Art Litigation
Tumbling Toward the Supreme Court, 159 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 253,
253-55 (2011) (same); Bert Demarsin, Let's Not Talk about Terezin: Restitution
of Nazi Era Looted Art and the Tenuousness of Public International Law, 37
BROOK. J. INT'L L. 117, 160-65, 185 (2011) (accusing U.S. museums of
ignoring ethical obligations and "raising technical defenses if such might allow
museums to retain possession of Nazi era looted pieces"); see also Jennifer
Anglim Kreder, Fighting Corruption of the Historical Record: Nazi-Looted Art
Litigation, 61 U. KAN. L. REV. 75, 103-18 (2012) (suggesting a complicity
between courts and museums against "true owners" of contested art works);
Jennifer Anglim Kreder, State Law Holocaust-Era Art Claims and Federal
Executive Power, 105 Nw. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 315, 324 (2011) ("Rather than
look into the thorny cases, courts seem to be willing to engage in judicial
abdication of their responsibility . . . ." (citations omitted)); Bert Demarsin, Has
the Time (of Laches) Come? Recent Nazi-Era Art Litigation in the New York
Forum, 59 BUFF. L. REv. 621, 633, 691 (criticizing statutes of limitation as "a
major exception to the traditional nemo dat doctrine" that purchasers cannot
acquire title from thieves, and criticizing New York courts' recognition of the
statute of limitations and laches defenses because "Holocaust survivors will
most likely no longer prevail in any attempt to obtain recovery of their stolen
heirlooms"); see also Raymond Dowd, Art Law: Boston Museum of Fine Arts:
Sues Heirs of Jews to Keep Stolen Property, Hides Evidence, COPYRIGHT
LITIGATION BLOG (July 20, 2011), http://copyrightlitigation.blogspot.com/
2011/07/art-law-boston-museum-of-fine-arts-sues.html (accusing the Museum
of Fine Arts, Boston of unethically suing Holocaust victims' heirs to retain
allegedly stolen property).
7. See, e.g., Kreder, The New Battleground, supra note 6, at 47 ("In contrast
to the optimistic hopes in 1998 to settle all [Holocaust-era art] claims expressed,
we have seen a new trend emerge whereby current possessors of art displaced
during the Holocaust, including museums, have been the first to file suit to quiet
title, raising technical defenses."); Kreder, Guarding the Historical Record,
supra note 6, at 254 (stating a preference for resolution of cases "on the merits"
rather than on "technical grounds"); Jennifer Anglim Kreder, State Law
Holocaust-Era Art Claims and Federal Executive Power, 105 NORTHWESTERN
L. REV. COLLOQUY 315, 331 (2011) (suggesting that "technical defenses" are
not "just and fair"); Demarsin, Let's Not Talk about Terezin, supra note 6, at
282
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Indeed, Professor Kreder has contended in numerous articles that
museums act contrary to applicable ethical guidelines when they
litigate against Nazi era art restitution claims and assert time bar
defenses.'
While perhaps morally compelling to a point, this view ignores
two critical features of claims to recover artworks that changed
hands during the Holocaust and are now held by U.S. museums.
First, as with all legal claims, not all claims to recover such works
of art are equal. Some claims are valid and based on sound
provenance research, as they involve works of art demonstrably
stolen by the Nazis. Other meritorious claims might involve works
with key gaps in provenance, which, while not directly probative,
may support suspicion about the circumstances under which the
original owners parted with the works-such as in an early sale by
a European dealer known to sell Nazi-confiscated artworks.
However, some other claims are not meritorious at all. For
example, some cases involve families that willingly parted with
works of art while conditions in Germany or other countries
deteriorated (but before the Nazis were systematically stealing
works of art), creating some ambiguity as to whether the sale was
coerced. Other claims concern families that pursued restitution of
some works of art after World War II but did not pursue other
works that they knew of and that their families had parted with at
some point, suggesting that the family members themselves did
not believe that certain works had been wrongfully taken. Any
thoughtful approach to these issues must acknowledge that not all
Nazi-era art restitution claims should be treated equally.
Second, the view that United States museums somehow act
improperly when they initiate or vigorously defend litigation
involving stolen Nazi-era artwork discounts the truly difficult
choices that museums must make in dealing with Nazi-era art
160 (juxtaposing the defenses of laches and statutory limitation against museum
commitment to waive defenses when equitable); see also Dowd, supra note 6
("the MFA bringing a 'declaration of title' action is completely stupid, immoral
and unethical").
8. See, e.g., Jennifer Anglim Kreder, Fighting Corruption of the Historical
Record, supra note 6, at 83 (dismissal of cases "without addressing the merits"
"contraven[es] . . . museums' own ethics guidelines"); Kreder, The New
Battleground, supra note 6, at 37-47.
2013] 283
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claims in light of their institutional obligations. As discussed
below, museums have professional responsibilities as museums;
fiduciary obligations to the public that oblige them to take all
reasonable steps to protect the assets they hold in trust; and ethical
obligations to the claimants who assert ownership of works long
held by museums. While museums must take all Nazi-era art
restitution claims seriously, as their codes of ethics demand, a
museum may conclude after diligent research that a claim is not
meritorious, indicating that the museum holds good title to the
work. In such circumstances, there is no legal or ethical bar to
museums initiating litigation to quiet title to works. Nor is there
any bar to museums taking all reasonable litigation steps to prevail
in such litigation at minimal expense-including by invoking
statutes of limitations or laches where appropriate. Indeed, it
would be inconsistent with museums' obligation to safeguard their
assets to require such institutions to fully litigate apparently
unmeritorious claims despite an obvious time bar.
Despite a few critics' broadsides against museums, the available
evidence does not suggest museums have engaged in improper
conduct in this arena. In the very few cases where museums have
initiated litigation and invoked limitations periods to defeat claims
to works in their collections, each museum has had a strong
evidentiary reason for believing both that the claim was not
meritorious and that the claim was time-barred. In contrast, there
are far more instances where museums, faced with claims by the
heirs of Holocaust victims, have voluntarily restituted the works to
the claimants or amicably reached monetary settlements that allow
the museums to retain the works at issue--even in instances where
the museum could have asserted a time bar.
This article will explore the legal and ethical considerations
governing museums' responsibilities when confronted with Nazi-
era art claims, arguing that it is proper for museums to initiate
litigation and to invoke time-based defenses when faced with a
claim that provenance research shows to be weak or
unsubstantiated. First, we provide basic historical background
concerning the Nazis' systematic looting of artworks and the
changing policies that have increased claimants' abilities to locate
and assert claims to missing art in the decades since World War II.
Second, we describe the legal and policy considerations governing
284
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museums' responses to Nazi-era art claims. We examine
museums' fiduciary obligations to the public and the professional
codes of ethics that guide museums' conduct. We also focus on
the interests of fairness and equity that statutes of limitations and
laches serve, and we show that, in the few cases where museums
have advanced so-called "technical defenses," there were prudent
and good faith reasons for doing so. Finally, we contrast these few
cases where U.S. museums initiated litigation with the many
instances where museums have responded with voluntary
restitution or fair compensation for the artworks, evidencing that
museums treat meritorious claims fairly and appropriately.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF NAZI LOOTING AND
CHANGING POLICIES
Between 1933 and 1945, the Nazis embarked on a systematic
pillaging of Europe's art and artifacts. Some sources estimate that
they looted between one-fourth and one-third of Europe's art.
Their looting was not incidental or isolated. Rather, it was part of
a long-term, bureaucratic process, well documented in the
literature on this subject.9 The Nazis, seeking both to destroy
"degenerate" art and to disenfranchise and persecute Jewish
people, created entire legal structures based around stripping
Jewish people of their legal rights and their possessions, including
art.'0 The Nazis painstakingly covered some of their tracks, for
example by forcing Jewish people to sell their art collections under
false pretenses of legality; as a result much stolen art was
dispersed around the world, while other works were hidden away."
9. See generally KURTZ, supra note 1; FELICIANO, supra note 1;
PETROPOULOS, supra note 1; NICHOLAS, supra note 1.
10. Emily A. Graefe, The Conflicting Obligations of Museums Possessing
Nazi-Looted Art, 51 B.C. L. REV. 473, 473-74 (citing Kaye, Avoidance and
Resolution of Cultural Heritage Disputes, supra note 2, at 243-44; David
Wissbroecker, Six Klimts, a Picasso & a Schiele: Recent Litigation Attempts to
Recover Nazi Stolen Art, 14 DEPAUL-LCA J. ART & ENT. L. & POL'Y 39, 40
(2004); Owen Pell, The Potential for a Mediation/Arbitration Commission to
Resolve Disputes Relating to Artworks Stolen or Looted During World War 11,
10 DEPAUL-LCA J. ART. & ENT. L. & POL'Y 27, 30 (1999)).
11. Id.at473-74&nn.1-13.
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The movement to recover Nazi-looted art arguably began during
and after World War II, when the Allies worked to return stolen
works to their countries of origin or sometimes directly to their
owners. 2 In the decades after the War, organizations like the
Claims Conference began to work for international agreements and
protocols to process claims for the restitution of property stolen by
the Nazis." In the 1980s, European nations such as Austria began
to release public lists of Nazi-looted art and other property, and to
make public the details of their processes for returning that
property to its owners. 4 In the 1990s, however, an increased
international focus on Nazi-looted art resulted in concentrated
worldwide efforts to develop new laws and policies meant to
expedite restitution of Nazi-looted art." The United States,
Germany, and Switzerland all pledged to open their archives of
lists and records of stolen art, which was made easier by the Nazis'
scrupulous tracking of what they had stolen.'"
As discussed below, in the late 1990s, international agreements
like those developed at the Washington Conference on Holocaust-
Era Assets and later international meetings helped to drive public
discourse and international agreements on the proper way to
proceed with claims for Nazi-looted art. In addition, museums
began to develop codes of ethics to govern their acquisition,
deaccessioning, and lending activity with a mind toward making
their processes just, fair, transparent, and efficient. Many
museums, nations, and interested nonprofits also began to host
searchable, online archives of unprovenanced art, art that changed
hands in Europe between 1933 and 1945, and other helpful
12. E.g., Pell, supra note 10, at 37 (discussing World War 11-era Allied art
restitution projects like the Monuments, Fine Arts, and Archive Services unit
and external restitution).
13. History of the Claims Conference, CLAIMS CONF.,
http://www.claimscon.org/index.asp?url=history (last visited Aug. 9, 2011).
14. See, e.g., Douglas C. McGill, Austria Sets Up System to Yield Nazi-Held
Art, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 3, 1985, http://www.nytimes.com/1985/12/03/arts/
austria-sets-up-system-to-yield-nazi-held-art.html.
15. See, e.g., Kaye, Avoidance and Resolution, supra note 2, at 260-61.
16. See Thomas Lippman, 44 Nations Pledge to Act on Art Looted by the
Nazis, WASH. PoST, Dec. 4, 1998, at A2.
286
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information. 7 At that point it became far easier for claimants to
discover the basis for their ownership claims to works that had
belonged to them or their families, and to locate works they or
their families had once owned-and so to assert restitution claims
to works now held by museums.
III. LAW AND POLICY CONSIDERATIONS GOVERNING MUSEUMS'
RESPONSES TO NAZI-ERA ART CLAIMS
The historical reality of the Nazis' confiscation of art
unavoidably creates a morally charged context for considering
how current holders of works that changed hands in that period
respond to restitution claims. This historical background appears
to have fueled the charge by critics that museums have applied
"technical defenses" of statutes of limitations or laches to resolve
cases efficiently and economically-the implication being that
museums undertake such defenses, on some level, to cheat
claimants or take from them an opportunity to litigate their claims
on the merits." Nonetheless, any thoughtful consideration of how
museums have responded to such restitution claims must consider
the broader duties of a museum-both the museum's fiduciary
obligations of loyalty and care to the public and to its trust
property as well as the applicable professional codes of ethics that
guide museums' conduct. In addition, any substantial analysis of
these issues must consider the policy reasons behind the defenses
of statute of limitations and laches-rather than simply dismissing
them as "technical defenses." These doctrines are meant to serve
the interests of fairness and equity, procedural values that gain
meaning here not just from the claimant's situation but also from
the museum's fiduciary duties and codes of ethics. We consider
these issues in turn.
17. See id.
18. For an example of such an argument, see Kreder, Guarding the
Historical Record, supra note 6, at 253-55.
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A. Fiduciary Duties ofMuseums
We start with the particular characteristics of museums that
necessarily shape their responses to restitution claims. Broadly
speaking, a museum is "a permanent, non-profit institution,
essentially educational or aesthetic in purpose, with professional
staff, which acquires objects, cares for them, interprets them, and
exhibits them to the public on some regular schedule."" In the
United States, some museums are federal, state, or local
government agencies, but most are "charitable trusts, charitable
corporations, or nonprofit corporations"-organizations created
for the public benefit.20 Such museums seek, broadly, "to serve the
public through art and art education," to help "convey[] the rich
complexity of human experience," and to foster cultural
diversity.2' Board members and directors of these museums are
trustees-they are bound by the fiduciary duties of their museums,
their trusts, and the beneficiaries of their trusts (if the museum is a
public nonprofit) are the members of the general public.22
As a general matter, under state law, the fiduciary duties of a
trustee of a charitable trust include the duty
"to take reasonable steps to assume and maintain
control of the trust property; to use reasonable care
and skill to preserve the trust property; to take
reasonable steps to realize on claims that are a part
19. Ass'N OF ART MUSEUM DIRECTORS, PROFESSIONAL PRACTICE IN ART
MUSEUMS 9 (1971), quoted in Patty Gerstenblith, The Fiduciary Duties of
Museum Trustees, 8 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 175, 176 (1983).
20. See Patty Gerstenblith, Acquisition and Deacquisition of Museum
Collections and the Fiduciary Obligations of Museums to the Public, 11
CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L. 409, 451-52 (discussing the evolving goals of
public museums).
21. See, e.g., Values, AsS'N OF ART MUSEUM DIRECTORS,
http://www.aamd.org/about/ (last visited July 30, 2011).
22. Gerstenblith, Fiduciary Duties, supra note 19, at 176-77. As Patty
Gerstenblith notes, while those responsible for the management of museums
may have many titles, they are nevertheless "trustees," nomenclature that also
helps to distinguish them from those professionals who have the title "director"
but are responsible to the museum trustees. See id. at 177 n.5.
288
10
DePaul Journal of Art, Technology & Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 23, Iss. 2 [2016], Art. 2
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol23/iss2/2
NAZI-ERA ART CLAIMS
of the trust property; [and] to defend [against]
actions that may result in a loss to the trust estate,
unless it is reasonable not to make such defense." 23
The trustee is duty-bound to administer trust property solely in the
beneficiary's interest and "to take reasonable steps under the
circumstances to take and keep control of and to preserve the trust
property." 24  The duty of loyalty requires trustees to be loyal to
their museum's charitable purpose-generally public education,
cultural preservation, and so on.25  The duty of care requires
23. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 379 (1959) (citations omitted);
see, e.g., NY EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 11-1.1 (McKinney 2011)
(describing New York's fiduciary duties).
24. CAL PROB. CODE §§ 16002, 16006 (West 2011) ("The trustee has a duty
to administer the trust solely in the interest of the beneficiaries . . . The trustee
has a duty to take reasonable steps under the circumstances to take and keep
control of and to preserve the trust property."); see also, e.g., NY EST. POWERS
& TRUSTS LAW § 8-1.1 (trustee must ensure that the trust renders the public
benefit for which it has earned its charitable status), repealed by In re Fleet Nat.
Bank 864 N.Y.S. 2d 706 (2008) (holding that "provisions of EPTL § 8-1:1, to
the extent that they may be in conflict with the [Surrogate's Court Procedure
Act], must by implication, be deemed to have been repealed).
Professor Gerstenblith has noted the conflict among some academics and the
"sparse case law" regarding exactly how charitable corporations' trustees or
directors' conduct should be judged, because charitable trustees are generally
expected to fulfill a standard of "utmost loyalty to the trust," with no self-
dealing allowed, whereas corporate directors may "engage in self-interested
transactions with the corporation so long as there is disclosure and the interested
director can establish fairness to the corporation." Gerstenblith, Acquisition and
Deacquisition, supra note 20, at 417-20 & nn.41-56 (giving a thorough
overview of the nonprofit-corporate debate regarding museum trustees'
fiduciary duties and the relevant standards). We do not delve into this debate
here, but assume application of a trust standard-a more demanding standard
that reflects the strong public duties and nonprofit ethics that shape a museum's
trust status. See Emily A. Graefe, The Conflicting Obligations of Museums
Possessing Nazi-Looted Art, 51 B.C. L. REv. 473, 494 nn.173-75 (2010).
25. See Gerstenblith, Acquisition and Deacquisition, supra note 20, at 416;
see also Gerstenblith, Fiduciary Duties, supra note 19, at 177; CAL PROB. CODE
§§ 16002, 16006 ("The trustee has a duty to administer the trust solely in the
interest of the beneficiaries .. . The trustee has a duty to take reasonable steps
under the circumstances to take and keep control of and to preserve the trust
property."); see also, e.g., NY EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 8-1.1 (trustee
2013] 289
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trustees to "be attentive to the management and preservation of the
museum's physical assets (the building and, in the case of a
museum, its collections) and monetary assets (endowment and
other financial investments)." 26
The obligation to preserve trust assets has two overlapping and
critical implications here. First, consider a museum that owns a
work that was duly accessioned into its collection and that is then
the subject of a claim that it was taken by the Nazis from an
original owner and is now owned by the heirs of that owner. In
responding to such a claim, the museum must thoroughly
investigate the provenance of the work and the claim asserted, to
determine if the restitution claim is well-grounded; it must also
consider the costs or benefits to the museum itself of retaining or
restituting the work, as well as the value or risks posed to the
museum's beneficiaries, the public.27 Put simply, a museum
cannot, consistent with its trustees' duty of care, deaccession a
work in response to a restitution claim unless the museum's
investigation concludes that the claim is meritorious.
Second, if it is necessary for a museum to litigate against a claim
that the museum concludes is not meritorious, the duty to preserve
trust assets compels the museum to seek to litigate the issue as
efficiently as possible. That is, having done its diligence and
determined on the facts that its acquisition of a work included
good title, a museum is required to employ the most efficient and
economical means possible to avoid protracted, expensive
litigation that the museum reasonably believes will ultimately
result in its title to the work being confirmed.28
must ensure that the trust renders the public benefit for which it has earned its
charitable status).
26. Gerstenblith, Acquisition and Deacquisition, supra note 20, at 416; see
also CAL PROB. CODE §§ 16002, 16006; NY EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 8-
1.1.
27. See Gerstenblith, Acquisition and Deacquisition, supra note 20, at 420;
Graefe, supra note 10, at 493-98.
28. See, e.g., CAL PROB. CODE §§ 16002, 16006 ("The trustee has a duty to
administer the trust solely in the interest of the beneficiaries . . . The trustee has
a duty to take reasonable steps under the circumstances to take and keep control
of and to preserve the trust property."); see also, e.g., NY EST. POWERS &
TRUSTS LAW § 8-1.1 (trustee must ensure that the trust renders the public
290
12
DePaul Journal of Art, Technology & Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 23, Iss. 2 [2016], Art. 2
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol23/iss2/2
NAZI-ERA ART CLAIMS
A critical feature of public museums is their responsibility to the
public-the concept of the public trust-which means that,
because museums' ultimate duties are to educate the public and
preserve the objects of human culture, museums cannot make the
decision to deaccession a work lightly.29 Rather, museums have a
legal duty to research claims made for works in their collections
diligently and thoroughly, and cannot simply decide to deaccession
works based on anything less than careful provenance research.
The assertion that museums have some kind of duty to return
works simply because they are subject to restitution claims is
unfounded. The general rule here, as one commentator has noted,
is that a museum faced with a restitution claim must "ascertain the
facts, sift them carefully in light of trust responsibilities, and be
prepared to defend its action as prudent and taken in good faith." 0
B. Professional Codes of Ethics
A museum's decision of whether or not to litigate against a
claim should not be taken lightly, and must be guided by a set of
general but compelling codes of ethics that balance the unique
hardships of Holocaust victims and heirs with the duties museums
have to the public at large. In 1998, after several Congressional
hearings considered legislation that would have set legal
requirements for provenance research and established a standard
for returning stolen works, two major museum professionals'
associations-the American Alliance of Museums and the
Association of Art Museum Directors-developed self-regulatory
codes of ethics specifically concerning art that changed hands
benefit for which it has earned its charitable status); see generally MARIE C.
MALARO, A LEGAL PRIMER ON MANAGING MUSEUM COLLECTIONS 235 (1998).
29. See Gerstenblith, Fiduciary Duties, supra note 19 at 192 (introducing the
concept of the public trust, "that once an object is put into the public domain in
the form of a charitable gift or trust, the object cannot later be returned to
private hands"); see also Erin L. Thompson, Cultural Losses and Cultural
Gains: Ethical Dilemmas in WWII-Looted Art Repatriation Claims Against
Public Institutions, 33 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 407, 414-18 (2011)
(discussing duties of museums to the public good).
30. MALARO,supra note 28, at 235.
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during the Nazi/World War I era." These codes of ethics are not
binding, nor do they commit museums to a position that requires
either a presumption of claimants' correctness or the immediate
return of claimed works. However, they do establish general
guidelines for resolving claims of ownership related to items in the
museum's custody quickly, equitably, and appropriately.
The American Alliance of Museums, formerly the American
Association of Museums (the "AAM"), represents a broad scope
of museums and museum employees, sets standards for the
museum industry, advocates for museum interests, and shares
knowledge about the museum industry. It published a general
Code of Ethics for Museums (the "Code") in 1991 and amended it
in 2000.32 The Code is AAM's formal statement of the ethical
principles that museums and their employees should observe."
These principles center on the idea that "[fjor museums, public
service is paramount."3 4 By subscribing to the Code, the AAM
states, "[m]useums ... affirm their chartered purpose, ensure the
prudent application of their resources, enhance their effectiveness,
and maintain public confidence."" The Code states specifically
that museum governance is a public trust, as discussed above,36
and that all museum activities related to the museum's collections
and its physical, human, and financial resources must be in the
service of the public. Specifically, the Code requires museums to
conduct all acquisitions, deaccessions, and loans with the good of
the public in mind."
The Code serves as the background principles for the several
sets of Ethical Guidelines disseminated by the AAM, including
one concerning "The Unlawful Appropriation of Objects During
31. See, e.g., Gerstenblith, Acquisition and Deacquisition, supra note 20, at
437.
32. AM. Ass'N OF MUSEUMS, CODE OF ETHICS FOR MUSEUMS 1 (2000),
available at http://www.aam-us.org/resources/ethics-standards-and-best-
practices/code-of-ethics-for-museums.
33. See id.
34. Id. at 2.
35. Id.
36. See id. at 2; see also Gerstenblith, Fiduciary Duties, supra note 19, at
192-93 (discussing the public trust).
37. See CODE OF ETHICS FOR MUSEUMS, supra note 32, at 3.
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the Nazi Era," which was approved in 1999 and amended in
2001.38 This set of Guidelines reasserts the Code's emphasis on
the public trust and states that "ethical stewardship is paramount."
The Guidelines encourage museums to catalogue objects in their
collections, primarily European paintings and Judaica, that were
acquired after 1932, that changed ownership between 1932 and
1946, and that were (or might reasonably be thought to have been)
in Europe during those dates." It also urges museums to make
provenance information for those objects available online, and to
give priority to continuing provenance research as resources
allow.40
The Guidelines also urge museums to consider all questions of
provenance on a case-by-case basis, with a mind toward
cooperation and reconciliation, and to proceed carefully with any
claims regarding such items.4' Specifically, the Guidelines require
museums to conduct their own research on any disputed item's
provenance, in addition to requesting information from claimants.42
They also remind museums that, pursuant to their fiduciary
obligations, "[t]heir stewardship duties and their responsibilities to
the public they serve require that any decision to acquire, borrow,
or dispose of objects be taken only after the completion of
appropriate steps and careful consideration."43 These requirements
and suggestions are meant to reconcile museums' fiduciary duties
with the unique demands of Holocaust victims and heirs,
essentially by amplifying what museums arguably must already do
given their fiduciary duties."
Likewise, the Association of Art Museum Directors (the
"AAMD"), an organization founded to set professional standards
38. AM. Ass'N OF MUSEUMS, GUIDELINES CONCERNING THE UNLAWFUL
APPROPRIATION OF OBJECTS DURING THE NAZI ERA 1 (2001), available at
http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/tk/en/folklore/creative-heritage/docs/aa
m guidelines.pdf.
39. Id. at 2.
40. Id. at 2-3.
41. Id, at 3.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 7.
44. See GUIDELINES CONCERNING THE UNLAWFUL APPROPRIATION OF
OBJECTS DURING THE NAZI ERA, supra note 38, at 7.
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for museums and their directors, has disseminated several papers
meant to establish guidelines for museums faced with claims for
art in their collections that changed hands during the Nazi era.45
The Report of the AAMD Task Force on the Spoliation of Art
During the Nazi/World War II Era (1933-1945)46 and the AAMD's
position paper Art Museums and the Identification of Works Stolen
by the Nazis4 7 should be read in conjunction with the AAMD's
regularly updated guideline document Professional Practices in
Art Museums48 and the AAMD Policy on Deaccessioning.49
Together these documents, like the AAM Guidelines, suggest that
museums analyze their collections for works that they acquired
during or shortly after the Nazi era, and works that may have
changed hands (or that have provenance gaps) during that era."
These documents also suggest that claims be addressed quickly
and cooperatively, and that museums consider, on a fact-sensitive
basis, issues of how disputes and deaccessioning might affect both
museums' interests and their duties to the public.'
45. About AAMD, Ass'N OF ART MUSEUM DIRECTORS,
http://www.aamd.org/about/ (last visited Aug. 16, 2011).
46. Ass'N OF ART MUSEUM DIRECTORS, REPORT OF THE AAMD TASK
FORCE ON THE SPOLIATION OF ART DURING THE NAZI/WORLD WAR II ERA
(1933-1945) (June 4, 1998), available at
http://www.aamd.org/papers/guideln.php.
47. Ass'N OF ART MUSEUM DIRECTORS, ART MUSEUMS AND THE
IDENTIFICATION AND RESTITUTION OF WORKS STOLEN BY THE NAZIS (May
2007), available at http://www.aamd.org/papers/documents/Nazi-
lootedartclean 06_2007.pdf.
48. AsS'N OF ART MUSEUM DIRECTORS, PROFESSIONAL PRACTICES IN ART
MUSEUMS (2011), available at
http://www.aamd.org/papers/documents/2011 ProfessionalPracitiesinArtMuseu
ms.pdf.
49. Ass'N OF ART MUSEUM DIRECTORS, AAMD POLICY ON
DEACCESSIONING (June 9, 2010), available at
http://aamd.org/papers/documents/FinalDeaccessioningReport625_10.pdf.
50. See REPORT OF THE AAMD TASK FORCE, supra note 46; PROFESSIONAL
PRACTICES IN ART MUSEUMS, supra note 48, at 4, 8; AAMD POLICY ON
DEACCESSIONING, supra note 49, at 4-9, ART MUSEUMS AND THE
IDENTIFICATION AND RESTITUTION OF WORKS STOLEN BY THE NAZIS, supra
note 47, at 2-4.
51. See REPORT OF THE AAMD TASK FORCE, supra note 46; PROFESSIONAL
PRACTICES IN ART MUSEUMS, supra note 48, at 4, 8; AAMD POLICY ON
294
16
DePaul Journal of Art, Technology & Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 23, Iss. 2 [2016], Art. 2
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol23/iss2/2
NAZI-ERA ART CLAIMS
A final, significant, code of ethics is the one developed by the
International Council of Museums ("ICOM"), an organization
founded in 1946 as an international NGO to build a network of
museums and museum professionals to set standards in museums'
design, management, and collections organization, and to carry out
international missions in, for example, fighting the illicit
trafficking of cultural goods.52 ICOM's Code of Ethics does not
include specific language on Holocaust-era art or Nazi looting."
However, it does demand that museums exercise every effort in
investigating the provenance of all gifts, loans, bequests, or
exchanges, and also states that museums should deaccession works
only with the fullest understandings of those works' significance,
character, legal standing, and "any loss of public trust."5 4 ICOM
has, however, published a document that makes several
recommendations concerning works of art belonging to Jewish
owners-specifically, works belonging to Jewish owners that had
been confiscated during World War II." Like the AAM and
AAMD documents described above, the ICOM recommendations
urge museums to investigate and identify works obtained "during
or just after the Second World War, that might be regarded as of
dubious provenance," to address the drafting of procedures for
publicizing and returning those objects, and to "actively address"
the return of all such objects to their rightful owners.56
Further, two international agreements have responded to the
question of museums' legal and ethical obligations when faced
DEACCESSIONING, supra note 49, at 4-9, ART MUSEUMS AND THE
IDENTIFICATION AND RESTITUTION OF WORKS STOLEN BY THE NAZIS, supra
note 47, at 2-4.
52. ICOM in Brief, INT'L COUNCIL OF MUSEUMS, http://icom.museum/who-
we-are/the-organisation/icom-in-brief.html (last visited Aug. 18, 2011); ICOM
Missions, INT'L COUNCIL OF MUSEUMS, http://icom.museum/who-we-are/the-
organisation/icom-missions.html (last visited Aug. 18, 2011).
53. See generally INT'L COUNCIL OF MUSEUMS, ICOM CODE OF ETHICS FOR
MUSEUMS (2004), available at
http://icom.museum/fileadmin/user upload/pdflCodes/code2006_eng.pdf
54. Id. §§ 2.3 (provenance and due diligence), 2.13-.15 (deaccessioning).
55. INT'L COUNCIL OF MUSEUMS, ICOM RECOMMENDATIONS CONCERNING
THE RETURN OF WORKS OF ART BELONGING TO JEWISH OWNERS (Jan. 14,
1999), available at http://www.lootedartcommission.com/OXSHQE36019.
56. Id.
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with claims targeted at works in museum collections. One such
agreement, established in 1998, is the document generally referred
to as the Washington Conference Principles, which were
delineated at the Washington Conference on Holocaust-Era
Assets. The second major agreement, established in 2009 and
based largely on the Washington Conference Principles, is the
Terezin Declaration on Holocaust Era Assets and Related Issues,
established at the Prague Conference on Holocaust Era Assets."
Like the museum codes of ethics described above, these two
international agreements are non-binding and generally, not
specifically, prescriptive." They do not grant either party-the
art's possessor or its claimant-presumptions of correctness.60
Rather, they allow for the fact that while Holocaust victims (or
heirs) and museums often face unique factual circumstances for
each claim, not all claims are equal.
The Washington Principles-not established as museum codes
of ethics but rather as general guidelines for any disputes over
Nazi-era art-are substantively a list of eleven non-binding
principles meant to adapt to any member country's respective laws
and help guide countries' developments of rules regarding the
return of Nazi-era art.' Like the AAM and AAMD codes of
ethics, the Washington Principles encourage parties to analyze and
identify art in their possessions that was produced or changed
hands during the Nazi era (paying special attention to gaps and
ambiguities in provenance), to make their practices and records
57. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE & U.S. HOLOCAUST MEMORIAL MUSEUM,
PROCEEDINGS OF THE WASHINGTON CONFERENCE PRINCIPLES ON NAZI-
CONFISCATED ART app. G IT 1-11, at 971-72 (1998), available at
http://fcit.usfedu/holocaust/resource/assets/heacappe.pdf (hereinafter
"WASHINGTON CONFERENCE PRINCIPLES").
58. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE BUREAU OF EUROPEAN & EURASIAN AFFAIRS,
PRAGUE HOLOCAUST ERA ASSETS CONFERENCE: TEREZIN DECLARATION (June
30, 2009), available at http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/or/126162.htm
(hereinafter "TEREZN DECLARATION").
59. WASHINGTON CONFERENCE PRINCIPLES, supra note 57, at 971-72
(specifically non-binding); TEREZIN DECLARATION, supra note 58 (same).
60. See WASHINGTON CONFERENCE PRINCIPLES, supra note 57, at 971-72;
TEREZIN DECLARATION, supra note 58.
61. WASHINGTON CONFERENCE PRINCIPLES, supra note 57, at 971-72.
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transparent (including by creating centralized records), and to
publicize and restitute art found to have been stolen.62 When
stolen art is found, or when claimants come forward to ask that
allegedly stolen works be restituted, the Washington Principles
encourage expeditious, just, and fair solutions subject to fact-
specific analyses.63
Recognizing the Washington Principles' significance and
reaffirming the need for just, fair solutions to disputes over Nazi-
era art with due consideration to the unique circumstances of
Holocaust victims and heirs, the Terezin Declaration-again a
non-binding agreement-asks member countries to "continue and
support intensified systematic provenance research," specifically
by publishing relevant information broadly and establishing
mechanisms to help claimants in their searches.' Like the
Washington Principles, the Terezin Declaration encourages
member countries to work within their own laws in establishing
these solutions." As a point on which many commentators have
focused, the Terezin Declaration states that museums should
"facilitate just and fair solutions with regard to Nazi-confiscated
and looted art, and to make certain that claims to recover such art
are resolved expeditiously and based on the facts and merits of the
claims and all the relevant documents submitted by all parties."66
Some scholars argue that this language effectively prohibits
museums from employing so-called "technical means" or
"technical defenses" such as statutes of limitations when
responding to Holocaust-era art claims." Courts have rejected this
62. Id; see also supra notes 45-51 and associated text (discussing AAM and
AAMD codes of ethics).
63. WASHINGTON CONFERENCE PRINCIPLES, supra note 57, at 971-72.
64. TEREZIN DECLARATION, supra note 58.
65. Id.
66. Id. (emphasis added); see also, e.g., Brief for Amicus Curiae American
Jewish Congress et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Plaintiffs-Appellants and
Reversal, Grosz v. Museum of Modem Art, (2d Cir. Dec. 16, 2010) (No. 10-
257-cv), 2010 WL 2601991, at 10-11 (citing the Terezin Declaration for the
principle that museums should not use technical defenses at law, but should only
argue claims on their merits).
67. See Kreder, The New Battleground, supra note 6, at 38-39; see also
Demarsin, Let's Not Talk about Terezin, supra note 6 at 160-65.
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argument, as described below, and the structure of the declaration
does the same." "Just and fair solutions," as we argue throughout
this article, do not mean only those that advantage claimants; just
and fair solutions include justice and fairness for museums and the
public as well. Further, as explained below, museums have only
advanced "technical defenses" in cases where detailed provenance
research established the weakness of the underlying restitution
claim.
Despite their non-binding nature, however, all of these codes
and international agreements are influential and widely adopted."
They provide valuable guidance for what museums are already
obliged to do by their fiduciary obligations to the public: to ensure
that their collections, as well as their acquisitions, deaccessioning,
and loan policies, are lawful; to address claims for restitution of
museum property promptly, ethically, and equitably; and to
balance any possible loss of museum property or capital against
both their fiduciary and ethical obligations to the public at large
and their duties-legal, moral, and professional-to anyone who
asserts a claim to a work in the museum's collection.
Moreover, any claim that may remove a work from a museum
collection or cause a museum to expend time and money must
account for the fact that museums are public institutions, and that
any loss to a museum is arguably a loss to the public as well."
Claimant-museum relationships are not bilateral. They are
triangular, with the public providing the third point of
consideration." If a work is discovered to have been stolen during
the Nazi period (that is, taken by the Nazis or looted), then the
museum and its public will benefit from resolution of the object's
status, either through return of the property to the rightful owner or
68. See Museum of Fine Arts, Bos. v. Seger-Thomschitz, 623 F.3d 1, 13-14
(1st Cir. 2010); see also infra § IV.A (discussing this and other cases).
69. See Sue Chen, Note, Art Deaccessions and the Limits ofFiduciary Duty,
14 ART, ANTIQUITY & LAW 103, 113-14 (2009) (discussing the adoption and
influence of museums' codes of ethics).
70. See Thompson, Cultural Losses and Cultural Gains, supra note 29.
71. Cf Gerstenblith, Fiduciary Duties, supra note 19, at 192 (discussing the
public trust in the context of a museum's relationship to its own duties and to
the public at large).
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through the museums' lawful acquisition of the object.7 2 But a
museum must serve the public by resisting claims that do not raise
true issues of ownership, thereby resolving title to works in its
collection in a visible, binding fashion.
The U.S. Department of State's Special Envoy for Holocaust
Issues, Douglas Davidson, recently suggested that a museum's
public duty, alongside the guidelines and codes described above,
effectively creates to a duty to avoid litigation by entering
alternative dispute resolution, if not to an immediate duty to
return." This view ignores the other half of museums' public duty,
to take all reasonable steps to preserve trust assets when
appropriate. While in many cases museums can and do choose
negotiation and mediation in preference to litigation (as set out in
detail below), the court system remains in particular cases an
appropriate and ethical option for museums involved in disputes
over Nazi-era art, where the museum's provenance research
undermines the claim and the claimant refuses to withdraw it. In
such instances, the museum's public duty may compel a decision
to litigate the claim.
Professor Kreder has argued that the fact that a few museums
have filed declaratory judgments against some claimants and
asserted time bar defenses indicates that museums are exploiting
legal rules in contravention of their own codes of ethics and even
United States executive policy.74 This argument, not fully defined
72. See Graefe, supra note 10, at 497 & nn.206-07; Shirley Foster, Prudent
Provenance-Looking Your Gift Horse in the Mouth, 8 UCLA ENT. L. REV.
143, 147 (2001) ("In the context of Nazi-looted art however, the public is often
in favor of deaccessioning art stolen during the Holocaust. The trustees have to
weigh the gain in public sentiment against the loss of a painting that benefits the
public... Perhaps the greater common good would be served if the museum
abides by established property laws and returns a work to which it never had
good title.") (internal citations omitted).
73. See Douglas Davidson, Special Envoy for Holocaust Issues, U.S. Dep't
of State, Remarks at the New York County Law Association Symposium on
"Should Stolen Holocaust Art Be Returned?" (Mar. 25, 2013), available at
http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/rm/2013/mar/206719.htm.
74. Kreder, Guarding the Historical Record, supra note 6, at 253 ("Now,
museums are using American courts to shut down inquiries into [allegedly
looted art's history] by blocking claims on technical grounds, contrary to their
own ethics guidelines and U.S. executive policy.") (internal citations omitted);
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in any available published article, essentially assumes that any
museum response employing "technical grounds"-generally
statutes of limitations and laches-to defeat claims for allegedly
looted art in a museum's collection is unethical either because
such responses do not address claims of ownership "openly,
seriously, responsively, and with respect for the dignity of all
parties involved," or because any technical response is forbidden
either by museums' codes of ethics or United States policy."
First, while we discuss "technical defenses" in more detail
below, it bears emphasis here that no code of ethics prohibits a
museum from asserting any particular grounds to defeat a claim
that it concludes is meritless after duly researching the provenance
of the allegedly looted work, consistent with the museum's codes
of ethics, and sharing the findings of that research with the
claimant. Neither the codes of ethics nor the international
agreements discussed above forbid museums from engaging in
certain practices, such as initiating litigation or asserting time bar
defenses, when confronted with claims that, when researched
according to the museum's ethical obligations, are found lacking.
To be sure, museums may not employ such means indiscriminately
and without due consideration of the claims at issue." But there is
no bar to museums using such strategies judiciously, reasonably,
and in good faith.
Second, there is no sound basis for asserting that museums
contravene executive or international policy when asserting time
bar defenses to claims for allegedly Nazi-looted art that do not
appear meritorious. Professor Kreder has pointed to the
international Principles described above, as well as the United
Kreder, The New Battleground, supra note 6, at 56-75 (raising the same
argument); see also Demarsin, Let's Not Talk about Terezin, supra note 6 at
160-61 (similar).
75. See GUIDELINES CONCERNING THE UNLAWFUL APPROPRIATION OF
OBJECTS DURING THE NAZI ERA, supra note 38; See Kreder, Guarding the
Historical Record, supra note 6, at 253; Kreder, The New Battleground, supra
note 6, at 56-75.
76. See, e.g., WASHINGTON CONFERENCE PRINCIPLES, supra note 57, at 971-
72 (requiring museums to be careful, reasonable, and thorough-among other
things-in addressing claims for restitution); CODE OF ETHICS FOR MUSEUMS,
supra note 32 (same).
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States' post-World War II policy of "reliev[ing] American courts
from any restraint upon the exercise of their jurisdiction to pass
upon the validity of the acts of Nazi officials."" Effectively the
same argument was advanced and rejected in Museum of Fine
Arts, Boston v. Seger-Thomschitz before the First Circuit. There
the claimant contended that the Massachusetts statute of
limitations was preempted by these commitments of the executive
branch. The claimant cited the Supreme Court's decision in
American Insurance Association v. Garamendi for the holding that
"state law must give way" when it is in "clear conflict" with an
"express federal policy" in the foreign affairs context."
The First Circuit, however, found this principle inapposite
because the executive commitments cited-the Washington
Principles and the Terezin-Declaration-were not "express," and
moreover, even if they were, the Massachusetts statute of
limitations, modified by the discovery rule, would not have
conflicted with them.79 Critically, these declarations are, as the
First Circuit found, "phrased in general terms evincing no
particular hostility toward generally applicable statutes of
limitations."so They tend to encourage standards of
reasonableness, justice, and fairness, none of which implies (let
alone requires) a specific course of action in litigation."
Moreover, although the Terezin Declaration does state a
preference that Nazi-era art disputes be resolved "based on the
facts and merits" rather than on legal technicalities, that language
is "too general and too hedged to be used as evidence of an express
federal policy disfavoring statutes of limitations," the First Circuit
found.82 Indeed, the Terezin Declaration recognizes that all
77. See Kreder, Guarding the Historical Record, supra note 6, at 259 &
nn.39-42 (citing germane post-war court decisions that referred to U.S. policies
of the era, and citing the Washington Principles); see also id at 258-260
(discussing the trajectory of U.S. policy regarding restitution of Holocaust-era
assets lost under force or duress).
78. See Seger-Thomschitz, 623 F.3d at 13-14 (citing Am. Ins. Ass'n v.
Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 421-25 (2003)).
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 13.
82. Id.
2013] 301
23
Frankel and Forrest: Museums' Initiation of Declaratory Judgment Actions and Assertion
Published by Via Sapientiae, 2016
DEPAUL J. ART, TECH. & IP LAW [Vol. XXII:279
relevant issues be considered, and that some legal provisions that
may impede the restitution of art may still apply." Accordingly,
the First Circuit recognized that time bar defenses may be
appropriate in particular factual contexts; certainly, had the parties
to that Declaration wished definitively to ban such defenses, they
would have done so. 84
C. "Technical Defenses" and the Interests ofFairness and Equity
Statutes of limitations are legislatively defined procedural limits
on civil and criminal actions." Professor Kreder in particular has
criticized the assertion of statutes of limitations in actions for the
restitution of Nazi-era artworks, on the grounds that a time bar
defense may deprive parties of the opportunity to resolve claims
on their merits. 6 However, statutes of limitations are crafted to
promote the interests of fairness and equity between both parties,
and specifically, as the seminal article on the topic states, the
"primary consideration underlying [statutes of limitations] is
undoubtedly one of fairness to the defendant."" Justice Jackson's
83. Id.
84. See Seger-Thomschitz, 623 F.3d at 13.
85. See generally Developments in the Law: Statutes ofLimitations, 6 HARV.
L. REV. 1177 (1950) (providing the seminal overview of statutes of limitations
in American law).
86. E.g., Kreder, Guarding the Historical Record, supra note 6, at 260-69
(criticizing Holocaust-era art restitution holdings based on statutes of
limitations); id. at 253-55 (arguing that invocation of "technical defenses" is
virtually always unethical); see also Demarsin, Let's Not Talk about Terezin,
supra note 6 at 164-65 (similar); Therese O'Donnell, The Restitution of
Holocaust Looted Art and Transitional Justice: The Perfect Storm or the Raft of
the Medusa?, 22 EURO. J. INT'L L. 49, 65-67 (2011) (criticizing statutes of
limitations on equitable grounds and suggesting that such statutes may shift
burdens onto wronged original owners). Cf Stephen K. Urice, Elizabeth
Taylor's Van Gogh: An Alternative Route to Restitution of Holocaust Art, 22
DEPAUL J. ART, TECH. & INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 10 (2011) ("In a number of
disputes ... the cases have been decided not on the merits or by findings of
facts that clarify the history of the works in question, but, instead, by successful
assertion of a statute-of-limitations defense.").
87. Developments in the Law: Statute of Limitations, supra note 85, at 1185.
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classic formulation of the policy reasons behind statutes of
limitations remains the guide for any discussion:
Statutes of limitation, like the equitable doctrine of
laches, in their conclusive effects are designed to
promote justice by preventing surprises through the
revival of claims that have been allowed to slumber
until evidence has been lost, memories have faded,
and witnesses have disappeared. The theory is that
even if one has a just claim it is unjust not to put the
adversary on notice to defend within the period of
limitation and that the right to be free of stale
claims in time comes to prevail over the right to
prosecute them."
The underlying purposes of statutes of limitations, then, are
intended to allow for and encourage adjudication of claims on the
merits, when that is possible. As has been long recognized,
statutes of limitations aim to discourage potential claimants from
sleeping on their rights. When, however, that has occurred,
statutes of limitations presume that the passage of time will limit
the availability of evidence and make it difficult if not impossible
for disputes to be adjudicated "on the merits"-that is, based on all
the evidence from all witnesses and sources that once might have
been brought to bear. Critics of statutes of limitations in this
context complain that dismissal of claims based on a time bar
88. Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Railway Express Agency, 321 U.S. 342,
348-49 (1944); see also United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 117 (1979)
(citing Order of R.R. Telegraphers, 321 U.S. at 348-49); United States v.
Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 322 n.14 (1971) (same); Burnett v. N.Y. Central R.R.
Co., 380 U.S. 424, 428 (1965) (same); Chase Secs. Co. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S.
304, 314 (1945); Missouri K&T R.R. Co. v. Harriman, 227 U.S. 657, 672
(1913) (same); Bell v. Morrison, 26 U.S. 351, 360 (1828) ("[A statute of
limitations] is a wise and beneficial law, not designed merely to raise a
presumption of payment of a just debt, from lapse of time, but to afford security
against stale demands, after the true state of the transaction may have been
forgotten, or be incapable of explanation, by reason of the death or removal of
witnesses.").
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precludes "addressing the merits."" But it is the passage of time-
and the loss of evidence it inevitably brings-that precludes
adjudication "on the merits."
As time passes, "the merits" of a case become harder to access.
Often, all that remains is attenuated evidence that is "hard to
disprove, and easy to fabricate.""o Statutes of limitations embody
the judgment of legislatures that, at some point, against this
prejudicial progression, defendants should be allowed to bring to
bear a presumption which our legal tradition has generally found
to be true: that "claims which are valid, are not usually allowed to
remain neglected."9 1 And in this way, "statutes of limitation
supply the place of evidence lost or impaired by lapse of
time. . . ."92 As the Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized,
decisions based on statutes of limitations are decisions on the
merits;93 they are decisions based on the evidence that if the
delaying party knew of its rights, it would not have sat on them for
so long.94 Applied to the present context, the passage of time
beyond an applicable statutory period also can be evidence that the
89. E.g., Kreder, Fighting Corruption of the Historical Record: Nazi-Looted
Art Litigation, supra note 6, at 83.
90. Bell, 26 U.S. at 360.
91. Riddlesbarger v. Hartford Ins. Co., 74 U.S. 386, 390 (1868); see also
United States v. Oregon Lumber Co., 260 U.S. 290, 299-301 (1922) (quoting
Riddlesbarger, 74 U.S. at 390).
92. Oregon Lumber, 260 U.S. at 299-301 ("The defense of the statute of
limitations is not a technical defense but substantial and meritorious. . .. Such
statutes are not only statutes of repose, but they supply the place of evidence lost
or impaired by lapse of time, by raising a presumption which renders proof
unnecessary.") (citing Bell, 26 U.S. at 360, Hanger v. Abbott, 6 Wall. 532, 538;
Wood v. Carpenter, 101 U. S. 135, 139; Riddlesbarger, 74 U.S. at 390, United
States v. Chandler-Dunbar Co., 209 U. S. 447, 450); see also Wood v.
Carpenter, 101 U.S. 135, 139 (1879) ("Statutes of limitation are vital to the
welfare of society and are favored in the law. . . . While time is constantly
destroying the evidence of rights, they supply its place by a presumption which
renders proof unnecessary. Mere delay, extending to the limit prescribed, is
itself a conclusive bar. The bane and antidote go together.") (emphasis added).
93. See, e.g., U. S. v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 117 (1979); Guar. Trust Co. of
New York v. United States, 304 U.S. 126, 136 (1938); Oregon Lumber, 260
U.S. at 299-301.
94. See, e.g., Kubrick, 444 U.S. at 117; Guar. Trust, 304 U.S. at 136;
Oregon Lumber, 260 U.S. at 299-301.
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prior putative owners did not believe they owned the art in
question because, had they, they would have brought a claim
earlier. Hence, the distinction between "technical defenses" and
rulings "on the merits" begins to fade, and, in a sense, decisions
based on statutes of limitations are decisions based on the
evidence-or, in some respects, the presumed lack of evidence.
Like statutes of limitations, the equitable doctrine of laches
prevents a claimant from bringing stale claims. But unlike a
statute of limitations, laches is not a legislative creation but a
judge-made device of the common law. Based on the same
reasoning as statutes of limitations, laches recognizes that "time
necessarily obscures all human evidence, and deprives parties of
the means of ascertaining the nature of original transactions;
[laches, therefore] operates by way of presumption in favor of the
party in possession.""
Here, too, labeling the defense as merely "technical" obscures
the deep consideration of merits that underlies its operation.
Though decrying absolutely any application of the doctrine in the
context of restitution claims, Professor Demarsin concedes, "[a]s
an equitable defense, laches requires proof of actual staleness,
consisting in loss of evidence, material and detrimental changes in
position of the defendant, or other circumstances that would lead
to special harm if the relief sought by the claimant was granted."96
But even where the defendant establishes these elements, a
plaintiffs "[l]ong acquiescence and laches . . . can[] be
excused. . . by showing some actual hindrance or impediment
caused by the fraud or concealment of the party in possession,
which will appeal to the conscience of the [court]."97 In the
museum context, courts will not deem a claim for restitution time-
barred under the doctrine of laches unless the plaintiff, through no
fault of the museum, inexcusably delayed in bringing the case in a
95. Wagner v. Baird, 48 U.S. 234, 258-59 (1849) (cited by City of Sherrill,
N.Y. v. Oneida Indian Nation of New York, 544 U.S. 197, 217 (2005).
96. Demarsin, Has the Time (of Laches) Come?, supra note 6 at 628-29
(emphasis in original). Professor Demarsin further admits that the passage of
time prejudices defendants more than plaintiffs, although he laments that this
proves "more advantageous to the defendant" in the laches inquiry. Id. at 687.
97. Wagner, 48 U.S. at 258 (citations omitted).
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way that resulted in actual harm to the museum. Laches, then,
asks the court to hold open its doors only to those who come in
clean conscience, good faith, and diligence.9 8
Accordingly, when employed by a museum guided by ethical
principles that insist on the return of stolen or questionable
artworks, whose fiduciary obligations demand that they rigorously
consider any action that might require deaccessioning of artworks
or cultural objects, statutes of limitations and laches provide
necessary, just, and equitable checks on certain claims. These
defenses allow museums to keep works to which they have valid
claims-without unnecessarily devoting trust assets to avoidable
litigation.
Moreover, statutes of limitations are not employed by courts in
an unforgiving manner. Rather, to address the seemingly harsh
result of having rights cut off entirely through the passage of time,
legislatures and courts have adopted exceptions to limitations
periods intended to allow some claims to proceed. For current
purposes these exceptions generally fall into two areas, the
"demand-and-refusal rule" primarily applied in New York99 and
the "discovery rule" applied in most other states.'oo Under the
98. Id. Notably, at least one commentator has lamented that the New York
"demand-refusal rule, coupled with a laches defense that stresses the
unreasonableness, rather than the length, of the delay, tilts the balance too
unfairly in favor of [party bringing the restitution claim], particularly when such
[a claimant] is not diligent whereas the bona fide purchaser is." Ralph E.
Lerner, The Nazi Art Theft Problem and the Role of the Museum: A Proposed
Solution To Disputes Over Title, 31 N.Y.U. J. INT'LL. & POL. 15, 28 (1998).
99. E.g., Kunstsammlungen zu Weimer v. Elicofon, 678 F.2d 1150, 1161
(2d Cir. 1982) (demand-and-refusal rule applied to stolen World War II-era art);
Republic of Turkey v. Metropolitan Museum of Art, 762 F. Supp. 44, 45
(S.D.N.Y. 1990) (demand-and-refusal rule applied to Turkish cultural property
objects); Solomon R. Guggenheim Found. v. Lubell, 569 N.E.2d 426, 429 (N.Y.
1991) (demand-and-refusal rule applied to Chagall allegedly stolen from the
Met); Menzel v. List, 267 N.Y.S. 2d 804, 809 (1966) (demand-and-refusal rule
applied to Holocaust heirs' Chagall paintings that had been looted by the Nazis).
100. E.g., Autocephalous Greek-Orthodox Church of Cyprus v. Goldberg &
Feldman Fine Arts, Inc., 917 F.2d 278, 288-89 (7th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 502
U.S. 941 (1991) (discovery rule applied to mosaics stolen from a church in
Cyprus); O'Keeffe v. Snyder, 416 A.2d 862, 870 (N.J. 1980) (discovery rule
applied to art allegedly stolen from painter Georgia O'Keeffe).
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demand-and-refusal rule, the limitations period only begins to run
after the owner demands a return of the work-because only then
does the good faith holder of the work become a wrongdoer.'0'
Under the discovery rule, the limitations period begins to run only
after the owner learns (or, in the exercise of reasonable diligence,
should have learned) of the existence of a claim to the work and
the good-faith purchaser's possession of the work.0 2
As a practical matter, these doctrines mean that statutes of
limitations can cut off an otherwise valid claim only where a
potential claimant has constructive notice of a claim and then still
fails to pursue it for the statutory period. As the cases discussed
below make clear, the passage of time does often lead to the loss
of evidence. It is therefore far from obvious that application of the
statute of limitations to bar stale claims will necessarily create
unfairness-at least where, as in these cases, many decades have
passed since the events at issue, it may in fact avoid unfairness.
IV. How MUSEUMS HAVE RESPONDED To RESTITUTION
CLAIMS IN PRACTICE
Critics of how museums have responded to restitution claims
have argued-sometimes lacing their analysis with accusations
that museums' decisions are "stupid, immoral, and unethical"-
that museums have essentially used "technical defenses" to evade
real issues.0 3 These arguments are misplaced. As explained
above, the legal and policy principles behind statutes of
limitations, museums' fiduciary obligations, and codes of ethics
101. See Menzel, 267 N.Y.S. 2d at 809.
102. See, e.g., O'Keeffe, 416 A.2d at 870.
103. Dowd, supra note 6 (accusing the Boston Museum of Fine Arts of
unethically suing Holocaust victims' heirs to retain allegedly stolen property,
though the First Circuit had held that the museum had good title and that the
heirs' claim was unfounded); see Kreder, The New Battleground, supra note 6,
at 37-47 (arguing that museums' defense of their collections against certain
Holocaust-era art restitution claims is unethical and against U.S. policy);
Kreder, Guarding the Historical Record, supra note 6, at 253-55 (2011) (same);
see also Demarsin, Has the Time (of Laches) Come?, supra note 6 at 691
("henceforth, [heirs of] Holocaust survivors will most likely no longer prevail in
any attempt to obtain recovery for their stolen heirlooms").
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are meant to balance the relationship of claimants, museums, and
the public, with due deference given to the uniqueness of
Holocaust victims' and heirs' claims. But the real proof lies in a
careful consideration of how museums actually have responded to
restitution claims. Critics point selectively to a few cases in which
museums have chosen to litigate against weak or obviously
unmeritorious restitution claims. In fact, we are only aware of a
handful of cases-a tiny minority of documented restitution
claims-where museums have initiated litigation and invoked time
bar defenses. Far more frequently, museums faced with restitution
claims have opted to resolve such claims by mutual agreement,
whether by restituting the work voluntarily, purchasing the
disputed work from the claimant, or creating lending agreements
for disputed works in their collections after researching claims
brought for those works' return.'"
A. Cases in Which Museums Have Responded to Claims by
Initiating Litigation
To address what a few commentators have found so noteworthy,
we review the small number of cases in which museums have
responded to claims for works in their collections with declaratory
judgment actions and invocation of statutes of limitations or
laches.
As an initial matter, we briefly consider the procedural propriety
of museums, when faced with restitution claims they conclude are
not meritorious, initiating declaratory judgment actions.'o Under
the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act, a federal court may
"declare the rights and other legal relations of any interested party
104. See Thompson, supra note 29 at 426-27 ("the history of claims against
museums show that museums have always been reluctant to enter the courtroom
for restitution claims. In fact, museums generally allow the lawsuit to proceed
only when they are convinced that the work in question was not looted."); Urice,
supra note 86 at 10 ("More than eighty percent of the fifty claims involving
museums have settled out of court. In all but one of those settlements either the
work of art was restituted or its value (or an agreed portion of its value) was
paid to the claimant.").
105. See, e.g., Kreder, Fighting Corruption of the Historical Record, supra
note 6 at 109-114.
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seeking such declaration" where there is an "actual controversy"
between parties."o6 This procedure "permits an early adjudication
of the rights and legal remedies involved in a dispute ... This
remedy permits parties to minimize the accrual of avoidable losses
and damages, and affords a party threatened with a lawsuit an
opportunity to seek an adjudication without waiting for the
opposition to institute proceedings."o' In particular, where a
claimant asserts that a work long held by a museum actually
belongs to him or her-and presses this claim even after being
presented with the results of provenance research showing the
museum appears to hold good title-the museum should not have
to wait for the claimant to file suit. The availability of declaratory
judgment proceedings allows the museum to address a cloud upon
title to the work, which otherwise may make it problematic for the
museum to lend the work for exhibition at other venues until the
dispute is resolved. It is therefore unclear what is improper about
museums initiating litigation against parties that threaten litigation
against museums, at least where the museums have established a
strong basis for asserting their continued ownership of the works at
issue.
1. Toledo Museum of Art v. Ullin and Detroit Institute of Arts v.
Ullin
Toledo Museum of Art v. Ullin'" and Detroit Institute of Arts v.
Ullin'0 9 represented two museums' responses to one family's
claims of ownership to paintings owned by the museums. We
discuss the two cases together because the same claimants were
involved and the cases reached the same resolutions.
In Toledo Museum of Art v. Ullin, heirs of Martha Nathan, a
Jewish woman who was the widow of a prominent German Jewish
106. 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (2006).
107. 12 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 57.04[3]
(3d ed. 2007); see Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227 (1937)
(affirming Act's constitutionality).
108. Toledo Museum of Art v. Ullin, 477 F. Supp. 2d 802 (N.D. Ohio 2006).
109. Detroit Inst. of Arts v. Ullin, No. 06-10333, 2007 WL 1016996, at *1
(E.D. Mich. Mar. 31, 2007).
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art collector, asserted a claim of ownership to the Gauguin painting
Street Scene in Tahiti, held by the Toledo Museum of Arts
("TMA")."o Ms. Nathan had inherited her husband's art collection
after his death in 1922."' His will had stated that Ms. Nathan
could eventually sell some of the works she inherited in order to
meet her needs.1 2 In 1937, Ms. Nathan fled Nazi persecution in
Germany and acquired French citizenship in Paris, returning to
Germany in 1938 to sell her house, which at that point contained
several paintings, but not the Gauguin painting at issue, which she
had previously sent to Switzerland."' The Nazis forced Ms.
Nathan to turn over the paintings that were still in Germany."4
She moved permanently to Switzerland around 1939, but before
that, in December 1938, she had sold some of her artworks,
including the Gauguin painting, to a group of prominent European
art dealers she had known for years-Justin Thannhauser,
Alexander Ball, and George Wildenstein." The three collectors
purchased the Gauguin for about $6,900. As the court stated
regarding the sale and the TMA's later purchase of this painting:
In short, this sale occurred outside Germany by and
between private individuals who were familiar with
each other. The Painting was not confiscated or
looted by the Nazis; the sale was not at the direction
of, nor did the proceeds benefit, the Nazi regime.
Several months later, in May 1939, TMA purchased
the Painting from Wildenstein & Co. for U.S.
$25,000. TMA has had the Painting on display in
Ohio and internationally since 1939 with Martha
Nathan noted as prior owner.'16
110. Toledo Museum, 477 F. Supp. 2d at 804-05.
111. Id. at 804.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id
115. Id. at 804-05.
116. Toledo Museum, 477 F. Supp. 2d at 805.
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After World War II and the fall of the Nazi regime, Ms. Nathan
pursued claims for her losses resulting from Nazi persecution,
"including the exit tax she paid, the sale of her home for less than
its fair market value, the six paintings she turned over to the
Staedel Art Institute, and the household items she left in storage in
France.""' For more than forty years, the Nathan estate
successfully pursued these claims, but it never claimed ownership
of the Gauguin painting in question until 2004, five years after the
AAM's guidelines had been established."' At that point the TMA
provided the Nathan heirs with information about the Gauguin
painting's provenance before it brought a declaratory judgment
action to quiet title to the painting, arguing that over sixty-six
years had passed since its purchase of the painting, meaning that
the Nathans' heirs' claim of ownership was barred by Ohio's four-
year statute of limitations." 9 The defendant heirs counterclaimed
for conversion, restitution, and declaratory judgment, demanding
possession of the Gauguin or compensation for their alleged
loss.120
The court noted that while Martha Nathan and her estate had
diligently pursued claims for other lost properties from the end of
World War II and onward, they had never challenged the 1939
Gauguin sale or the subsequent sale to TMA, which long displayed
the painting with Martha Nathan explicitly noted as its prior
owner.121 Indeed, the court stated,
Martha Nathan knew better than anyone the facts
surrounding her own purported sale.... Any fraud,
duress, or wrongdoing would or should have been
known at the time the art dealers' [sic] acquired the
painting. Even if, for some unexplained reason, she
could not discover any wrongdoing at the time,
once the chaos of World War II Europe subsided, a
reasonable and prudent person would have made
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 807-08.
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further inquiry into the terms of her sale to the art
dealers. 122
The court imputed this knowledge to Martha Nathan's heirs, and
noted that even if it had not done so, the heirs should have made
inquiries into the Gauguin's provenance long before.'23 An
accounting of Ms. Nathan's estate had been made after her death
in 1958; her executor made additional Holocaust-related claims for
several decades after that; and the public debate about Nazi-era
artworks should have been enough to put the Nathans' heirs on
notice, since they knew Ms. Nathan had sustained, and pursued
actions on, wartime losses.'2 4 Therefore, under the discovery rule,
the defendants should by reasonable diligence have discovered Ms.
Nathan's claim against TMA, whether in 1938 at the painting's
first sale, in 1939 at TMA's purchase of it, by Martha Nathan's
death in 1958, or at the latest when Congress publicized the issue
of Nazi-era assets (especially artworks) in 1998.125 Since they
brought no such claims even when they reasonably should have
known about them, the court held their claims time-barred.'2 6
Notably-and contrary to some commentators' argument that
claimants in such cases should be allowed to take their cases to
trial on the merits-the court noted that the claimants could prove
no set of facts entitling them to relief.'27
The second case involving the Nathan heirs, Detroit Institute of
Arts v. Ullin, proceeded along similar lines.'28 There the claim
involved a Van Gogh painting, Les Becheurs, which Martha
Nathan had similarly taken to Switzerland in 1938 and sold to the
three art dealers mentioned above, Thannhauser, Ball, and
122. Toledo Museum, 477 F. Supp. 2d at 807 (footnote omitted).
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 807-08.
126. Id. at 808-09.
127. Compare Kreder, Guarding the Historical Record, supra note 6
(arguing that statute of limitations claims ignore the facts), with Toledo
Museum, 477 F. Supp. 2d at 808-09 (examining the factual record and
concluding that no set of facts could entitle the claimants to relief).
128. See Detroit Inst., 2007 WL 1016996 at *1.
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Wildenstein.129  As with the Gauguin, neither Ms. Nathan, her
executor, or her heirs had brought claims for the Van Gogh
painting, although they had brought many for other property,
including the paintings that Ms. Nathan had been forced to give up
after she returned briefly to Germany. 130 The Detroit Institute of
Art (the "DIA") had possessed the Van Gogh since 1969, after
receiving it as a bequest from an art collector who had purchased it
from the three art dealers in 1938."' The Nathans' heirs demanded
the painting from the DIA in 2004. The DIA investigated their
claims and the provenance of the Van Gogh, rejected the claim,
and filed a declaratory judgment action to quiet title, after which
the defendant heirs counter-claimed for conversion, restitution, and
declaratory judgment.132
The DIA then moved to dismiss the counter-claim because
Michigan's three-year statute of limitations had long since run
against the heirs."' The court found that Michigan does not apply
the discovery rule in conversion claims because of "public policies
favoring finality in commercial transactions, protecting a
defendant from stale claims, and requiring a plaintiff to diligently
pursue his claim."'34 Accordingly, the court held that the heirs'
claim had accrued in 1938-meaning that the statute of limitations
on all their claims had run-and that, even if the statute of
limitations had not run, the Nathans' heirs should reasonably have
discovered a possible cause of action regarding the Van Gogh in
the 1970s, when Ms. Nathan's estate's executor had made
additional claims regarding the Nathan family's wartime losses.'3 5
In both of these cases, the critical facts were that the paintings
had been part of transactions separate from any forced sales, and
that the claimants' families had known of these transactions but
129. Id.
130. Id. at *2.
131. Id at *1.
132. Id at *2.
133. Id.
134. Detroit Inst., 2007 WL 1016996 at *3 (quoting Brennan v. Edward D.
Jones & Co., 626 N.W. 2d 917, 920 (Mich. 2001)).
135. Id. at *34.
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never included them in any claims for restitution after the War.'
The museums had publicly displayed their paintings, including
information about Martha Nathan's ownership of them, for
decades, and had provided the claimants with the provenance
research on which the museums based their claims for retention.17
In these circumstances, it is doubtful that the museums could have,
consistent with their fiduciary duties, decided to restitute the
paintings in any event. Rather, the museums' thorough review of
the available facts about the paintings' histories compelled the
defense of the museums' ownership, and the use of the most
economical and efficient litigation approach-invocation of time
bars to obviously stale claims. Their "technical defenses" were
not, therefore, unethical means of protecting ill-gotten art; they
were tools in the museums' defenses of trust property, and
appropriately invoked in the public interest. As noted above, not
all claims are equal, and these were unmeritorious claims that were
appropriately adjudicated at an early stage.
2. Museum of Modem Art v. Schoeps
In Museum of Modern Art v. Schoeps, the claimant was a grand-
nephew of prominent Jewish banker and art collector Paul von
Mendelssohn-Bartholdy. He asserted ownership of two Picasso
paintings, Boy Leading a Horse and Le Moulin de la Galette,
which resided respectively in the collections of New York's
Museum of Modem Art and the Solomon R. Guggenheim
Foundation.' Mendelssohn-Bartholdy had owned the paintings
until around the time of his death in 1935, when he sold them to
Justin Thannhauser, the same art dealer from the Toledo Museum
136. Toledo Museum, 477 F. Supp. 2d at 807-08 (Martha Nathan and her
executor diligently pursued claims for other paintings from her collection but
not the paintings the claimants sought); Detroit Inst., 2007 WL 1016996 at *3-4
(similar).
137. Toledo Museum, 477 F. Supp. 2d at 805 (TMA shared provenance
information); Detroit Inst., 2007 WL 1016996 at *2 (DIA researched the
claimants' request before moving to protect its ownership of the paintings).
138. Schoeps v. Museum of Modem Art, 549 F. Supp. 2d 543, 544-45
(S.D.N.Y. 2008).
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and Detroit Institute cases.139 Thannhauser sold Boy Leading a
Horse to the collector William S. Paley in 1936, and in 1964 Paley
donated the painting to the Museum of Modem Art. Thannhauser
himself donated Le Moulin de la Galette to the Guggenheim
Foundation in 1963.140 In 2007, Julius Schoeps, Mendelssohn-
Bartholdy's grand-nephew, asserted ownership against both
museums for the paintings, and the two museums initiated an
action for declaratory relief against Schoeps.14' The museums
argued in part that Mendelssohn-Bartholdy had gifted the two
paintings to his second wife in 1927, thereby excluding them from
his will (which was executed in 1935) and so precluding Schoeps
from being able to make claims to them.14 2
Schoeps did not argue that Thannhauser coerced the von
Mendelssohn-Bartholdy family in order to precipitate the sale of
the paintings, nor did he contend that the Nazis forced the sale to
the Jewish Thannhauser.143 Instead, he claimed that Paul von
Mendelssohn-Bartholdy or his wife, Elsa, sold the paintings due to
financial distress caused by Nazi persecution. 4 4 In response, the
museums cataloged evidence establishing that the von
Mendelssohn-Bartholdys were worth the equivalent of between $5
million and $10 million at the time of the transfer, not counting
their extensive art collection; that they owned and lived in palaces,
not the least of which is now the German president's home; that
they enjoyed great social prestige at the time the paintings were
sold, despite Paul's Jewish ancestry; that Elsa also came from an
aristocratic German family and was considered "Aryan" according
to Nazi racial classifications; that Paul was one of two senior
partners of Mendelssohn Bank, one of Germany's most important
private banks and part of the consortium that enabled the foreign
borrowing behind Germany's rearmament; and that the banking
139. Id.
140. Id.
14 1. Id.
142. Id. at 545.
143. Memorandum of Law in Support of the Museum of Modem Art and the
Solomon R. Guggenheim Foundation's Motion for Summary Judgment at 12,
Schoeps v. Museum of Modem Art, 549 F. Supp. 2d 543 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (No.
07 CV 11074), 2008 WL 4679447.
144. Id.
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business made significant profits until the time of Paul's natural
death (and although it had suffered losses, those losses were based
in the Great Depression and the economic woes of Weimar and
predated the Nazi regime).'4 5 There was considerable evidence
contradicting the notion that the paintings were wrongfully
acquired by an art dealer preying upon the von Mendelssohn-
Bartholdy's economic and social duress.
Unpersuaded that the von Mendelssohn-Bartholdy family would
have asserted a claim to the paintings, the museums asserted the
defense of laches, arguing that "reasonable diligence" would have
counseled Schoeps and his ancestors to bring claims earlier, "while
relevant witness[es] to the event in question were still alive."' 46
The museums catalogued considerable evidence that prior
generations did not believe they had a valid claim to the paintings.
For example, shortly after Paul's death, Elsa who had purchased
and collected art in her own right, had two appraisal inventories
done of the forty-two paintings in her collection.'4 7 She annotated
those appraisals in her own handwriting, noting the pieces that had
been "verloren" or lost.'48 Neither Moulin nor Boy-a massive
seven-by-four foot piece that had been prominently displayed at
the entryway to the dining room, so that its absence would have
been acutely felt-were listed or so marked.'49 Moreover, Elsa
was not shy about bringing claims when she
thought she had been wronged .... Before the end
of the war, she litigated over being charged . .. 750
[Reichsmark] for the cancellation in official records
of a property encumbrance. After the war, she
made an unsuccessful restitution claim for the von
Mendelssohn-Bartholdy country estate ... which
had been seized by the Red Army.... During the
145. Id. at 12-15.
146. Answer and Affirmative Defenses at 27, Schoeps v. Museum of
Modem Art, (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (No. 07 CV 11074); see Schoeps, 549 F. Supp. 2d
at 549.
147. See Memorandum of Law, supra note 143 at 15.
148. Id.
149. Id.
316
38
DePaul Journal of Art, Technology & Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 23, Iss. 2 [2016], Art. 2
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol23/iss2/2
NAZI-ERA ART CLAIMS
war, she could have been helped in pursuing claims
by her second husband, Imperial Count von
Kesselstatt, who was a Luftwaffe pilot and a
member of the aristocracy. After the war, they
lived comfortably in Switzerland, and would have
been able to report any claim to the Swiss or
German authorities.... If Elsa thought the
Paintings had been stolen rather than sold, she
would have reported their theft to the authorities."'o
The same was true of Schoeps's grandmother and mother, and
Paul Mendelssohn-Bartholdy's other sisters: all of them knew of
the importance and value of the von Mendelssohn-Bartholdy art
collection and had enjoyed a position that would have allowed
them to assert claims to any works they believed had been
misappropriated.'
Given these basic facts about the history of the paintings and the
family, it was certainly reasonable for the museums to conclude
that the original owners and their immediate heirs did not believe
they retained an ownership claim to the paintings. It was therefore
appropriate for the museums not to restitute the paintings, but to
assert their ownership of the works-and to seek to do so in as
efficient a manner as possible by invoking a time bar defense.
Indeed, for the reasons discussed above, it would have been
inconsistent with the museums' duties for them simply to restitute
the works, given the results of their provenance research.
However, the court never ultimately decided whether the equities
supported the defense of laches. The court found there were
disputed issues of fact on laches and so set the issue to be resolved
after the trial; however, the parties settled before the fact-intensive
hearing could occur.'52
150. Id. at 16.
151. Id. at 19.
152. Schoeps v. Museum of Modem Art, 603 F. Supp. 2d 673, 674
(S.D.N.Y. 2009) (case settled on morning of trial). The settlement was
confidential, at the insistence of the claimant. See Schoeps v. Museum of
Modem Art, 599 F. Supp. 2d 532 (S.D.N.Y. 2009); see also Benjamin Weiser,
Heirs' Secrecy in Settlement Over Picassos Baffles Judge, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 24,
2009, at A25.
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3. Museum of Fine Arts, Boston v. Seger-Thomschitz
Most recently, in Museum of Fine Arts, Boston v. Seger-
Thomschitz, the Museum of Fine Arts in Boston ("MFA") filed a
declaratory judgment action in response to a claim from Dr.
Claudia Seger-Thomschitz, who asserted ownership of the 1913
Oskar Kokoschka painting Two Nudes (Lovers). 13
The Kokoschka painting had been owned in the 1920s and
1930s by Dr. Oskar Reichel, a Jewish doctor and art collector in
Vienna.'54 In 1939, Reichel transferred the ownership of the
Kokoschka and several other works to Otto Kallir, a Jewish gallery
owner to whom Reichel had earlier consigned the Kokoschka
painting for sale on numerous occasions; Kallir by then had
transferred ownership of his own gallery to a non-Jewish person
and moved to Paris.' One of Reichel's sons, Raimund, later
wrote that his father had agreed with Kallir that Kallir would
provide money to Reichel's sons in America.'5 6 According to
Raimund, Kallir sent Hans money for the Kokoschka and the other
paintings.' Kallir later settled in New York, opening a gallery
there in 1945, and sold the Kokoschka painting to another
gallery.'15  That gallery eventually sold the painting to a third
gallery, which then sold the painting to a private owner who, after
owning the work for many years, bequeathed it to the MFA in
1973.1'5 From then on, the MFA displayed the painting almost
continuously, occasionally loaning it to other museums in the
United States and internationally.'60
After living in South America for several decades, Raimund
Reichel returned to Vienna in 1982 and later designated Dr.
Claudia Seger-Thomschitz-the claimant-as his heir.6 ' The two
were not blood relatives and it is unclear how they knew each
153. Seger-Thomschitz, 623 F.3d at 2.
154. Id. at 3.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 4.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 4.
159. Seger-Thomschitz, 623 F.3d at 4.
160. Id.
161. Id.
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other.'62 When Raimund died in 1997, Seger-Thomschitz became
Oskar Reichel's sole surviving heir.'63 She allegedly learned in
2003 that the Nazis had confiscated some of Oskar Reichel's
works, when the Historical Museum of the City of Vienna
contacted her to notify her that it was going to turn over to her
several works by the artist Anton Romako that had been owned by
Oskar Reichel.'" The museum stated that it was doing so because
Reichel had apparently been forced to sell the Romako paintings to
Kallir's Neue Gallery in 1939, after Otto Kallir had transferred
ownership of the gallery."'
In 2006 an American attorney contacted Seger-Thomschitz to
inform her of the Kokoschka painting at the MFA. The next year,
through that attorney, Seger-Thomschitz demanded that the MFA
return the painting to her.166 Upon receipt of this claim, the MFA
"undertook 'an exhaustive effort to research and document the
provenance of the [Kokoschka] in order to ascertain whether
[Seger-Thomschitz's] claim ... appeared valid or not.""" This
work included "[visiting] approximately ten museums and
governmental archives around the world and [corresponding] with
numerous other museums and archives." 68  Following this
investigation, the MFA concluded that the transfer of the painting
from Dr. Reichel to Kallir was valid-and, critically, was regarded
by the Reichel family as valid after the war."' Notably, the
Reichel sons sought after the war to recover some artworks lost by
their father, but never asserted a claim to the Kokoschka painting,
although it was documented that they knew of their father's
ownership of the work and the circumstances under which he had
transferred it to Kallir.'70 When Seger-Thomschitz refused to
withdraw her claim to the painting, the MFA filed for declaratory
judgment to quiet title to the work; Seger-Thomschitz
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 5.
165. Seger-Thomschitz, 623 F.3d at 5.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id.
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counterclaimed to obtain the painting. 7 ' The MFA moved for
summary judgment on the theory that Seger-Thomschitz's
counterclaims were barred by Massachusetts' three-year
limitations period.172
The District Court, applying the discovery rule, granted the
MFA's motion for summary judgment, finding both that the
Reichel sons could have asserted a claim to the painting long ago,
if they thought such a claim appropriate, and that Seger-
Thomschitz should have known about the basis for any cause of
action against the MFA more than three years before she filed her
action. 7 1 On appeal, the First Circuit found that the Kokoschka
painting's location had been no secret-it had been listed in
several published books and at least one official catalogue raisonne
of Kokoschka's works as being in the MFA's possession.174
Likewise, the Getty Provenance Index showed that the painting
belonged to the MFA.'7 ' This, the court stated, indicated "that the
MFA's possession of the Painting [had] long been discoverable
with minimal diligence.""' Considering the question of "when the
Reichel family should have known that Dr. Reichel formerly
owned the Painting and gave it up under conditions that may have
amounted to duress," the court noted that letters Raimund wrote in
the 1980s demonstrated that he had been familiar with his father's
ownership of the painting and the transfer of it to Kallir;
nonetheless, he did not file a restitution or compensation claim for
the work, even as he filed claims listing other paintings his father
had owned-specifically, works by Romako."
Resting its decision on Seger-Thomschitz's knowledge of the
painting, the court noted that the Museums of Vienna's 2003
notice to her that it would return the Romako paintings should also
have given her notice that she would have had a claim to any other
paintings owned by Dr. Reichel-and she could easily have
171. Seger-Thomschitz, 623 F.3d at 5.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 8.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Seger-Thomschitz, 623 F.3d at 8.
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discovered that the Kokoschka was such a painting. The facts that
Reichel had owned the painting and that it was then in the MFA's
possession were ascertainable with minimal effort."' The First
Circuit, thus, found that Seger-Thomschitz's claim to the painting
was time-barred.'79
In her critique of the MFA's conduct and the First Circuit's
decision, Professor Kreder has conflated the history of the Romako
paintings with that of the Kokoschka, arguing that the Viennese
government's own assessment that the Romakos had been subject
to a forced sale should mean that the Kokoschka had as well. 80
But the historical record established both that the different
paintings were subjects of very different transactions and that the
Reichel sons-in a far better position to know than we today-did
not regard the two transactions in the same way. As the First
Circuit noted, Raimund Reichel had listed the Romakos but not the
Kokoschka in his restitution claims for financial compensation
after the war, and the family did not pursue any other investigation
of the Kokoschka painting, whose whereabouts and provenance
had been easily ascertained for years.'8 '
Indeed, while Professor Kreder cites to Seger-Thomschitz's
Counterclaim for historical facts,1' the litigation established that
numerous critical factual assertions in that pleading were incorrect.
In particular, the First Amended Answer and Counterclaim
asserted that Oskar Reichel's family had no knowledge of his
ownership of the Kokoschka painting at the time of the Anschluss;
had no knowledge of the circumstances under which Reichel had
transferred the painting to Kallir; received no compensation from
178. Id. at 9.
179. Id.
180. Kreder, Guarding the Historical Record, supra note 6, at 269 ("Thus,
whereas the Viennese government returned paintings because '[i]t is certain'
their path from Dr. Reichel though Mr. Kallir occurred 'due to . . . persecution,'
a U.S. federal court in Boston effectively elevated the public's enjoyment of the
paintings over the need to unwind transactions that financed genocide.") (citing
First Amended Answer and Counterclaim, Exhibit 1, at 2, Museum of Fine Arts,
Boston v. Seger-Thomschitz, 2009 WL 6506658 (D. Mass. July 24, 2008) (No.
08-10097)).
181. Seger-Thomschitz, 623 F.3d at 8.
182. See id.
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Kallir for the painting; and could not reasonably have located the
whereabouts of the painting after the war.' As set out in the text
(and reflected in the court opinions), the MFA's provenance
research established each of these assertions was not true. Faced
with Seger-Thomschitz's claim, the MFA had a fiduciary
obligation to investigate the basis for the claim. Having done so-
and having found the claim was unfounded and shared the results
of that research with the claimant-the museum could not,
consistent with its duty to preserve trust assets, deaccession the
painting and give it to Seger-Thomschitz. Not all claims are equal.
In closing its opinion, the First Circuit returned to the purposes
of statutes of limitations:
Inescapably, statutes of limitations are somewhat
arbitrary in their choice of a particular time period
for asserting a claim. Yet statutes of limitations
cannot be fairly characterized as technicalities, and
they serve important interests: ". . . . although
affording plaintiffs what the legislature deems a
reasonable time to present their claims, they protect
defendants and the courts from having to deal with
cases in which the search for truth may be seriously
impaired by the loss of evidence, whether by death
or disappearance of witnesses, fading memories,
disappearance of documents, or otherwise."'84
The Seger-Thomschitz case itself illustrates this justification for
limitation periods: Raimund Reichel was intimately familiar with
this father's art collection in the 1930s, and he lived until 1997.
Had he brought a claim to the Kokoschka in his lifetime, he could
have provided critical additional evidence concerning the
painting's history. But of course, the available evidence that the
MFA reviewed in its extensive provenance research demonstrated
that the reason Raimund made no such claim in his lifetime is that
he did not believe his father's 1939 transfer of the painting to
Kallir was invalid. In these circumstances, the MFA was not
183. First Amended Answer and Counterclaim, supra note 180, at 19-24.
184. Id. at 14 (citation omitted).
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required to protract more than necessary the time and expense of
responding to Seger-Thomschitz's unmeritorious claim, nor was it
prohibited from dispensing with the claim as quickly and
economically as possible. Indeed, it had a fiduciary duty to do
SO. 185
185. We add a brief note on one other recent decision where a museum did
not initiate litigation but, once sued, asserted and prevailed on a statute of
limitations defense in response to claims against it. Grosz v. Museum of
Modern Art, 772 F. Supp. 2d 473 (S.D.N.Y. 2010), aff'd, No. 10-257 (2d Cir.
Dec. 16, 2010), involved a claim by heirs of artist Georg Grosz to three
paintings by Grosz that had long been held by MoMA. Upon receiving the
heirs' demand in November 2003, the museum retained a former U.S. attorney
general to investigate thoroughly the claims and the paintings' provenance and
prepare a report to the museum's board. Id. at 484-85. His report concluded
that MoMA had no obligation to return the paintings. Id at 485. After the
museum refused to return the paintings, the claimants waited more than three
years to bring suit-which barred the suit under New York's demand-and-
refusal application of its three-year statute of limitations. Id. at 481-88. The
heirs alleged that the three paintings had all been taken by the Nazis from
Grosz's dealers in Germany and Holland in the 1930s. Id at 478-80. Notably,
George Grosz lived in New York after the war, and in 1953 he had seen one of
the paintings at MoMA. While he noted in two letters to family that the
painting had been "stolen from me," he never contacted anyone at MoMA to
claim the work and did not otherwise assert a claim to them in his lifetime. Id
at 480-81. In addition, Ralph Jentsch, the managing director of the Grosz Estate
and its representative in demanding the paintings from MoMA, was the author
of the catalogue raisonne for the artist and so likely more familiar with Grosz's
works than any other living person. Id. at 481. He had asserted claims to other
works of the artist as early as 1995, but did not pursue the works long at MoMA
until nearly a decade later. See Robin Pogrebin, Met Won't Show a Grosz at
Center of a Dispute, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 2006,
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/11/15/arts/design/15gros.html?.
Another case, Von Saher v Norton Simon Museum of Art at Pasadena, 592
F.3d 954 (9th Cir. 2009), and its decision on remand, 862 F. Supp. 2d 1044
(C.D. Cal. 2012), is worth noting here for the sake of completeness. The
museum in Von Saher did not initiate the litigation, and the central issue of the
litigation-whether the foreign affairs doctrine preempted specific California
statutes that extended the statute of limitations for Holocaust-era art recovery
claims-sets Von Saher apart from this paper's main considerations. In any
event, it is clear that the claim in Von Saher was time-barred, even though the
historical record discussed by the Von Saher courts does not make clear the
strength of the underlying claim for recovery.
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B. Cases Where Museums Have Responded to Claims with
Voluntary Restitution or Fair Compensation for the Works
While a few commentators criticize museums for their
''aggressive" litigation strategies in the few cases just described,
they pay little attention to the far greater number of cases in which
museums have responded to restitution claims by returning works
to the heirs of original owners or reaching a financial settlement
with the heirs-without litigation. In fact, beginning in 1998, with
Congress' focus on Nazi-era art theft and the development of the
museum codes of ethics described above, it appears that museums
have initiated active litigation in response to a restitution claim
four times, as described above. In four additional instances,
museums have been sued and settled by agreeing to return the
work or to a lending or purchase arrangement."' But in the vast
majority of circumstances, museums have either voluntarily
returned claimed works after researching their provenances, or
reached lending or purchase agreements with the claimants."'
These works include valuable paintings by Monet and Rubens; the
museums involved include those such as the MFA and the Toledo
Museum of Art, which have faced the ire of critics for choosing to
litigate in other cases to clear title to works in their collections.
The fact that museums have responded to most claims by
returning, purchasing, or borrowing the works at issue hardly
demonstrates that museums have acted improperly in responding
to restitution claims. Rather, it is exactly what should occur given
186. See Stephen W. Clark & Eliza Jacobs, Litigation Update: Legal Issues
in Museum Administration 2012-Case Summaries Appendix, in ALI-ABA
COURSE OF STUDY: LEGAL ISSUES IN MUSEUM ADMINISTRATION MAR. 19-21,
245-291 (2012) (listing cases).
187. See id.; see also Urice, supra note 86, at 9 ("More than eighty percent
of the fifty claims involving museums have settled out of court. In all but one of
those settlements either the work was restituted or its value (or an agreed portion
of its value) was paid to claimant"); Thompson, supra note 29 at 426-27 ("When
the record [of ownership] is less clear, museums often return a claimed work,
even if they do not believe fully that the claimant is entitled to it. Thus, a critic
of one of the most well-known restitution specialists .. . has said that his
restitution tactics are almost like blackmail because museums are so afraid of
the bad publicity, they feel they have no choice.").
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the framework of laws and duties described above: museums have
marshaled their resources to study the provenances of claimed
works and, when it appears those works were indeed stolen or
forcibly taken from original owners, returned the works to the
families or heirs-while litigating as efficiently as possible where
the claims did not appear meritorious. We review here a
representative sample of instances in which museums have
voluntarily returned, purchased, or borrowed works to which
claimants have asserted ownership and then provide a table of all
of the known situations where museums have come to mutually
agreeable solutions for claimed works for which their research did
not indicate that the museum had good title.'
In 2005, the Virginia Museum of Fine Arts returned a painting
by Jan Mostaert, Portrait of a Courtier (16th Century), to the
descendants of the Czartoryski family in Poland.'" The
Czartoryski family had transferred its painting from the Goluchow
Museum to safekeeping in Warsaw in 1939, where the Nazis
seized it in 1941 before moving it to a castle in Austria after the
Warsaw Uprising in 1944.190 The painting made its way to a
gallery in New York in 1948, which sold it to a collector who gave
the painting to the Virginia Museum in 1949.1' While researching
the provenance of works in its collection that had changed hands in
Europe between 1933 and 1945, the Virginia Museum discovered
the fact of the painting's looting and promptly returned the
painting to the Polish Embassy on behalf of the Czartoryksi
family's heirs.' 92
188. It bears emphasis that the information presented here likely
underestimates the proportion of restitution claims that museums resolve
amicably. Whereas every litigated restitution claim is a matter of public record,
there are likely amicable resolutions that go unnoticed.
189. Tara Burghart, Web Helps People Recover Plundered Art, WASH.
POST, June 17, 2006, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2006/06/17/AR2006061700418.html.
190. Jan Mostaert -Portrait of a Courtier, POLISH MINISTRY FOREIGN AFF.
(Dec. 15, 2005), http://www.msz.gov.pl/Jan,Mostaert,-
,Portrait,of,a,Courtier,3883.html (on file with the Journal).
191. Id.
192. Burghart, supra note 189.
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More recently, in 2010, the Museum of Fine Arts in Boston
returned The Entombment of Saint Vigilius, a 14th Century
embroidered panel, to the Museo Diocesano Tridentino in Italy,
from which it had disappeared during World War II. " The MFA
had purchased the panel from an Italian art dealer in 1946, and its
provenance remained unknown until 2008, when the Abegg-
Stiftung, a Swiss arts foundation and museum, gave notice to the
MFA that the panel was part of a series that had hung at the
Diocesano Tridentino.'9 4 The museum proceeded to research this
claim with the help of the Museo Diocesano Tridentino, and
reached an agreement among all parties to return the panel. 95
In 2011, Los Angeles' Getty Museum returned a 1640 painting,
Landscape with Cottage and Figures, by Pieter Molijn, which it
had purchased in good faith in 1972, to the heirs of Jacques
Goudstikker, a Jewish art dealer who fled the Netherlands in 1940
and died in an accident shortly thereafter.'96 Goudstikker's
collection, which he left behind in the Netherlands, was looted by
Hermann Goering and the Nazis, and his collection dispersed
around the world. 9 7 The Getty, researching the provenance of its
collection with the aid of Goudstikker's heirs, learned that the
Molijn painting had been among those looted by Goering before it
had eventually made its way to the Getty.'98 The Getty promptly
returned the work, which joined a traveling exhibition of art
reclaimed from the Goudstikker collection.'99
These instances of voluntary return are only illustrative
examples of the almost two-dozen occasions on which museums
193. Press Release, Museum of Fine Arts, Bos., MFA Returns 14th Century
Embroidery to the Museo Diocesano Tridentino in Trent, Italy, at 1 (Dec. 17,
2010), available at http://www.mfa.org/sites/default/files/Press%
20release%20Museo%20Diocensano%20Tridentino.pdf.
194. Id. at 2.
195. Id.
196. Mike Boehm, Getty Museum Agrees to Return Painting Looted by
Nazis, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 29, 2011, http://articles.1atimes.com/2011/
mar/29/entertainment/la-et-getty-painting-20110329.
197. Goudstikker: "At Long Last, Justice," PR NEWSWIRE, Feb. 6, 2006,
available at http://www.prnewswire.co.uk/cgi/news/release?id= 163251.
198. Boehm, supra note 196.
199. Id.
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have responded to art claims exactly as they should: with close
research and cooperation, following their codes of ethics' and
fiduciary obligations' requirements both to honor the unique
situations of Holocaust victims and their heirs, and to avoid
unnecessarily deaccessioning trust property or depriving the public
of the opportunity to see and study important works of art. In
some of these situations, as described above, museums have
decided that claims they received were valid, and that the works in
question should be returned. In many other situations, museums
have concluded the claims were well-founded, and so have turned
over the works; alternatively, to minimize the museum's loss of
trust property, to avoid limiting the public's access to artistic and
cultural works, and to make claimants whole, museums have
arranged purchase agreements or lending agreements with
claimants.
For example, in June 2000, the Art Institute of Chicago receive a
claim for the sculpture Bust of a Youth (1630) by Francesco Mochi
from the heirs of Federico Gentili di Giuseppe, a Jewish Italian
living in France who died of natural causes in 1940.200 As both
parties agreed, the Institute had purchased the sculpture in good
faith in 1941 from a London sculpture dealer who had purchased it
at an auction after di Giuseppe's death.20 ' After it received the
claim of the Gentili di Giuseppe heirs, the Institute studied the
provenance of the Mochi sculpture.20 2 It learned that the Gentili di
Giuseppe family had probably lost Gentili di Giuseppe's art
collection as a result of Vichy France's racist laws, and that other
museums, including the Louvre, had returned art that they had
purchased art from the auction at which the sculpture dealer had
purchased the Mochi sculpture. 203 Agreeing that this provenance
indicated that the work had not been legitimately transferred after
Gentili di Giuseppe's death, the Institute made an agreement with
the Gentili di Giuseppe heirs to purchase a portion of the family's
200. Alan Artner & Ron Grossman, Museum, Heirs Settle WWII-era Art
Dispute, CHI. TRIBUNE, June 13, 2000, http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2000-
06-13/news/0006130237 1 heirs-art-institute-auctioned.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id.
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interest in the sculpture and accept the remainder as a donation,
allowing the Gentili di Giuseppe heirs to be compensated and the
Institute to retain the work. 204 This was not mere compromise-a
spokesperson for the Gentili di Giuseppe family said after the deal
that the Institute's behavior had been "exemplary," and that the
agreement had established a "pattern of good faith" that aided the
family in recovering lost artworks from other museums.205
Several American museums have reached amicable settlements
with the heirs of Jakob and Rosa Oppenheimer, a Jewish couple
who owned and operated the Margraf concern, a consortium of
Berlin art galleries, the stock of which was forcibly sold in 1935.
The Smithsonian Institution and the San Diego Museum of Art
were the first American museums to reach financial settlements for
works of art that had been included in these auctions, in 2002 and
2004, respectively. 206 A particularly creative solution was reached
with the Oppenheimer heirs in 2009 by Hearst Castle, a California
state park and museum. The Oppenheimers' attorney had
discovered that Hearst Castle possessed three 16th century
Venetian paintings-by Jacopo Tintoretto, Giovanni Cariani, and
Paris Bordone-which had been included in the 1935 sales, and
filed a claim for their return in 2007.207 In 2009, through the State
of California, Hearst Castle returned the Tintoretto and Cariani
paintings to the heirs, replacing them with photographic
reproductions, and agreed with the family to keep and display the
Bordone painting at the museum in an exhibition about Nazi
looting.208 In 2011, the Museum of Fine Arts, Boston and the
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. See SMITHSONIAN, THE FREER GALLERY OF ART AND THE ARTHUR M.
SACKLER GALLERY: WORLD WAR II ERA PROVENANCE PROJECT, 1933-1945 24-
25 (2011), available at http://www.asia.si.edu/collections/
downloads/provenance022211 .pdf; Steven Kern, Peter Paul Rubens's Allegory
of Eternity: A Provenance Research Case Study, in VITALIZING MEMORY:
INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES ON PROVENANCE RESEARCH 148-53 (2004).
207. Peter Fimrite, 3 Nazi-Confiscated Works Found at Hearst Castle, S.F.
CHRON., Apr. 11, 2009, http://articles.sfgate.com/2009-04-1 1/bay-
area/17191336 1 nazis-heirs-jewish-family/.
208. Associated Press, California Returns Art to Heirs ofHolocaust Victims,
NBCNEWS.COM, Apr. 10, 2009, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/.
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Philadelphia Museum of Art reached financial settlements with the
Oppenheimer heirs after discovering that five 17th-century Italian
tapestries owned by the two museums had also been forcibly sold
in 1935. Both institutions had proactively contacted the
Oppenheimer heirs' attorney, after discovering the Nazi-era
provenance of the tapestries in the course of research on their
collections.209
Below, in Table 1, we briefly list all of the situations of which
we are aware in which museums have responded to restitution
claims with purchase or lending agreements, or voluntary
restitution.
Table 1: List of Museums' Voluntary Restitutions, Purchases, and Lending
Agreements. 210
1. Wadsworth Athenaeum, Hartford, CT (1998): Restituted The Bath of
Bathsheba by Jacopo Zucchi to the Italian Government. The painting had been
taken from an Italian Embassy during or immediately after World War 11.211
2. Seattle Art Museum, Seattle, WA (1999): After being sued by the heirs of
Paul Rosenberg for recovery of Matisse's painting Odalisque (1928), the
museum commissioned a study of the work's provenance by the Holocaust Art
Restitution Project. Based on the results of that research, the museum agreed to
return the work to the heirs.212
3. Art Institute of Chicago, Chicago IL (2000): Paid the heirs of Mr. Gentili
30159151 /ns/us news-life/t/calif-returns-art-heirs-holocaust-victims/.
209. See Nazi-Era Provenance Research, MUSEUM OF FINE ARTS, BOS.,
www.mfa.org/collections/provenance (last visited Mar. 23, 2013) (with further
links to the press release); 1960-91-1 Object Information, AAMD OBJECT
REGISTRY, http://aamdobjectregistry.org/node/644 (last visited Mar. 23, 2013).
210. The events in Table 1, as well as other cases of note, are helpfully
catalogued in Clark & Jacobs, Litigation Update, supra note 185, at 245-91.
211. Hilton Kramer, Even After Four Centuries, Caravaggio's a Knockout,
N.Y. OBSERVER, June 8, 1998, http://www.observer.com/1998/06/even-after-
four-centuries-caravaggios-a-knockout.
212. See Press Release, Seattle Art Museum, SAM to Return Matisse
Odalisque to Rosenbergs (June 14, 1999), available at http://www.museum-
security.org/99/029.html. The museum pursued claims against Knoedler & Co.,
the New York dealer from which the museum's donor had purchased the
Matisse, and ultimately settled with the dealer. See Clark & Jacobs, supra note
185 at 249-50.
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213. Artner & Grossman, supra note 199.
214. STUART E. EIZENSTAT, IMPERFECT JUSTICE: LOOTED ASSETS, SLAVE
LABOR, AND THE UNFINISHED BUSINESS OF WORLD WAR 11 201 (2003). There
were some press accounts suggesting the museum returned the painting to von
Gomperz's heirs, but in fact a settlement was reached that allowed the museum
to retain the work. See AAMD OBJECT REGISTRY No. 2000.3,
http://aamdobjectregistry.org/node/57 (last visited April 7, 2013); see also
Emily Yellin, North Carolina Art Museum Says It Will Return Painting Tied to
Nazi Theft, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6, 2000,
http://www.nytimes.com/2000/02/06/us/north-carolina-art-museum-says-it-will-
return-painting-tied-to-nazi-theft.html.
215. Charles Leroux, Boston Museum Settles Holocaust-Era Art Claim, CHI.
TRIBUNE, Oct. 21, 2000, http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2000-10-
21/news/0010210195 1 claims-holocaust-museum.
216. Leigh Rich, Heir to Get Painting Confiscated by Nazis, JWEEKLY.COM
(Nov. 10, 2000), http://www.jweekly.com/article/full/14467/heir-to-get-
painting-confiscated-by-nazis.
di Giuseppe for a partial interest in Bust of a Youth by Francesco Mochi (circa
1630) and accepted the remaining partial interest as a donation from the heirs.
Mr. di Giuseppe had died of natural causes in France in 1940, but his art
collection was then sold at public auction under order of the French Court.213
4. North Carolina Museum of Art, Raleigh, NC (2000): Paid the heirs of
Philipp von Gomperz $600,000 for Madonna and Child in a Landscape by
Lucas Cranach the Elder. The painting had been looted from Mr. von Gomperz
in October 1940.214
5. Museum of Fine Arts, Boston, MA (2000): The MFA paid the heirs of Mr.
Gentili di Giuseppe for a partial interest in Adoration of the Magi by Corrado
Giaquinto (circa 1725) and accepted the remaining partial interest as a donation
from the heirs. 215
6. Denver Museum of Art, Denver, CO (2000): Restituted The Letter, from
the School of Gerard Ter Borch (17th Century), to the daughter of Paul Hartog,
a Jewish banker from Berlin who was forced to sell the painting in 1934 and
later died in a concentration camp.216
7. National Gallery, Washington, D.C. (2000): Restituted Still Life with Fruit
and Game by Frans Snyders (circa 1615-20) to the Edgard Stem family, which
became aware of the painting through the Gallery's website. The painting had
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been confiscated from the Stern collection in Paris by the Nazis and traded by
Goering to Haberstock.2 17
8. Princeton University Art Museum, Princeton, NJ (2001): Along with the
dealer who sold the painting to the museum, the museum agreed to pay the fair
market value of the painting St. Bartholomew by Bernardino Pinturicchio to the
heirs of Gentili di Guiseppe, whose art collection was ordered sold at auction by
a French court after his death in 1940; the museum retains the painting. 218
9. Springfield Library and Museum Association, Springfield, MA (2001):
The Museum returned Spring Sowing (circa 1567) to the Italian government
after learning that it had disappeared during World War 11 after being loaned
from the Uffizi Gallery to the Italian Embassy in Warsaw. 219
10. Metropolitan Museum of Art, New York, NY (2001): The museum paid
an undisclosed amount to Henry H. Newman, who claimed that The Garden of
Monet's House in Argenteuil by Claude Monet had been purchased by his
grandfather in Germany in 1940 and kept in a bank vault during the War.220
11. Los Angeles County Museum of Art, Los Angeles, CA (2002): LACMA
returned a late Medieval Persian textile to a Polish foundation from which a
similar work had been looted during World War II after research confirmed that
the textile at LACMA was the same one that had been looted.22'
12. Detroit Institute of Arts, Detroit, MI (2002): In the course of considering
acquisition of A Man o' War and Other Ships off the Dutch Coast by Ludolf
Backhuysen (1692), the museum learned the painting had been left in an
Amsterdam bank vault by Jewish collector who left the Netherlands in 1942 and
then turned over to a Nazi-controlled entity. The museum and the English
217. National Gallery to Return a Family's Painting Looted by the Nazis,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21, 2000,
http://www.nytimes.com/2000/11/21/arts/21PAIN.html.
218. Marilyn Marks, Art Museum Reaches Agreement on Painting Sold
During World War 11 Era, NEWS AT PRINCETON (June 13, 2001),
http://www.princeton.edu/main/news/archive/A97/94/04S20/index.xml.
219. Martha Lufkin, The Springfield Museum Sues Knoedler, THE ART
NEWSPAPER, Oct. 12, 2003, available at
http://www.lootedart.com/news.php?r-MLUMO1850971.
220. Newman Claim Against Metropolitan Museum, INT'L FOUND. FOR ART
RESEARCH, http://www.ifar.org/case summary.php?docid= 1179703220 (last
accessed Aug. 19, 2011).
221. Suzanne Muchnic, Museum to Return Artwork Looted by Nazis, L.A.
TIMES, Mar. 7, 2002, http://articles.latimes.com/2002/mar/07/local/me-linen7.
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gallery from which it was buying the picture then negotiated the sale of the
painting from the heirs of the pre-war owner. 222
13. Vizcaya Museum and Gardens, Miami, FL (2002): In response to a
claim from the National Museum of Warsaw, returned the painting Holy Trinity,
Seat of Mercy, attributed to George Pencz. The work had been removed from
the National Museum of Warsaw without authorization during World War 11.223
14. Museum of Fine Arts, Boston, MA (2004): Restituted the panel painting
Virgin and Child to Anna Konopka Unrug of Poland in response to the claim for
the painting received from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of
Poland on behalf of Unrug. The painting had been in the family's Warsaw
apartment and was plundered during the Uprising of 1944. The claim was in
response to information the MFA had posted on its website concerning the
painting's history.224
15. San Diego Museum of Art, San Diego, CA (2004): Reached a settlement
with heirs of Rosa and Jakob Oppenheimer that would allow Rubens' Allegory
ofEternity to remain in the museum's collection.225
16. Smithsonian Institution (Freer Gallery of Art), Washington, D.C.
(2004): After receiving a claim in 2000 from the heirs of Rosa and Jakob
Oppenheimer, the Smithsonian reached a financial settlement that allowed the
institution to retain a Chinese bronze ritual vessel.226
17. Virginia Museum of Fine Arts, Richmond, VA (2004): The museum
returned Portrait of Jean d'Albon by Corneille de Lyon (16th century) to the
heir of an Austrian collector whose collection had been seized by the Gestapo
during the war.227
222. Looted Painting Enters DIA Collection, Owners Compensated, MAINE
ANTIQUE DIG. (2002), http://maineantiquedigest.com/articles archive/
articles/oct02/dial002.htm (on file with the author).
223. See Provenance Research, VIZCAYA MUSEUM & GARDENS,
http://www.vizcayamuseum.org/gallery-provenance.asp (last visited Mar. 23,
2013).
224. See MUSEUM OF FINE ARTS, Bos., supra note 209.
225. See Clark & Jacobs, supra note 185, at 253-54.
226. See Press Release, Smithsonian's Freer and Sackler Galleries, Freer and
Sackler Galleries Launch Web Site for World War 11 Provenance Project,
available at http://www.asia.si.edu/press/past/prProvenance.htm; accord,
SMITHSONIAN, supra note 217, at 24-25.
227. VMFA Will Return French Painting to Collector's Heirs, ANTIQUES &
ARTS ONLINE (June 8, 2004), http://antiquesandthearts.com/wrappersstory
.asp?file=2004-06-08_10-26-23.xml&event=shows (on file with author).
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18. Virginia Museum of Fine Arts, Richmond, VA (2005): The museum
learned in the course of provenance research that Portrait of a Courtier by Jan
Mostaert (16th Century) had been seized by the Nazis in 1941. The museum
then turned the painting over to the Polish Embassy on behalf of the
representative of the former owners' descendants.228
19.Kimball Art Museum, Fort Worth, TX (2006): After learning that the
Vichy Government had seized the contents of the home of Anna Jaffe, including
Glaucus and Scylla by J.M.W. Turner (1841), and that the painting had been
sold at an auction of "Jewish property" in July 1943, the museum restituted the
painting to the representative of the Jaffe heirs.229
20. Metropolitan Museum of Art, New York, NY (2007). The museum
returned the drawing Interior of Church from the School of Pieter Neeffs the
Elder (16th century) to the grandson of a Czech lawyer whose collection was
looted by the Nazis when they imprisoned him in 1939.230
21.Minneapolis Institute of Art, Minneapolis, MN (2008): After extensive
provenance research, the museum determined that Smoke Over Rooftops by
Fernand Leger (1911) had been taken as part of a collection confiscated by the
Nazis from Alphonse Kann, a major French collector; the museum turned the
painting over to an organization of the heirs of Kann.2 31
22. Hearst Castle, San Simeon, CA (2009): After learning from the
Oppenheimer family's attorney that three of the Castle's paintings, Portrait of
Alvise Vendramin by Jacopo Tintoretto (16th Century), Portrait of a Bearded
Gentleman by Giovanni Cariani (16th Century), and Venus and Cupid by Paris
Bordone (16th Century), had been liquidated by the Nazis and later sold at
auction. The museum returned the former two paintings and replaced them with
photographic reproductions, and retained the latter one for use in an exhibit
about Nazi-looted art.232
228. Clarke Bustard, Nazi-Looted Art to Be Returned: Virginia Museum Will
Give 1500s Flemish Painting to Poland, RICHMOND TIMES DISPATCH, Sept. 24,
2005, http://www.lootedart.com/news.php?r-MLIAIT466581.
229. Turner Returned: A Persistent Heir Gets Back a Looted Masterpiece,
THE ECONOMIST, Apr. 7, 2007, http://www.economist.com/node/8958224.
230. Press Release, N.Y. Holocaust Claims Processing Office, Looted
Drawing Returned to Heirs of Original Owner (Oct. 30, 2007), available at
http://www.claims.state.ny.us/pr07l030.htm.
231. Dave Itzikoff, Painting Stolen by Nazis Is Returned to Heirs, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 6, 2008, at C2.
232. See Associated Press, Cahfornia Returns Art to Heirs of Holocaust
Victims, supra note 208.
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23. Metropolitan Museum of Art, New York, NY (2009): The museum
returned the painting City on a Mountain Lake, attributed to a follower of the
Flemish artist Tobias Verhaecht (16th Century), to the heirs of a Czech lawyer
whose collection had been looted by the Nazis.233
24. Museum of Fine Arts, Boston, MA (2010): The museum returned the
14th Century embroidered panel The Entombment of Saint Vigilius to the Museo
Diocesano Tridentino in Italy after learning in 2008 that the panel had been
looted from Trent during World War 11.234
25. Indiana University Art Museum, Bloomington, IN (2011): The museum
returned the Flagellation of Christ, a panel painting by an unknown artist of the
Cologne School of the 1480s, to the Jadgschloss Grunewald museum in Berlin.
Responding to an inquiry from the Prussian Palaces and Gardens Foundation,
the museum undertook extensive provenance research on the painting,
ultimately discovering that the work was one of more than a dozen paintings
that had disappeared from the Berlin museum during the summer of 1945.235
26. J. Paul Getty Museum, Los Angeles, CA (2011): The museum returned
the painting Landscape with Cottage and Figures, by Pieter Molijn (17th
Century), to the heirs of Jacques Goudstikker, a Jewish art dealer who had fled
the Netherlands before the Nazi invasion in 1940. The painting had been in
Goudstikker's inventory at the time of the invasion, and had never been part of
a World War 11 restitution process.236
27. Jane Voorhees Zimmerli Art Museum at Rutgers University, New
Brunswick, NJ (2011): The museum returned the painting Portrait of a Young
Man by Hans Baldung Grien (1509) to Simon Goodman, whose grandparents
had traded the painting for safe passage out of Europe before Nazi officers
confiscated the art and deported the Gutmanns to separate camps, where they
died.237
28. Museum of Fine Arts, Boston, MA (2011): The MFA reached a
confidential agreement with the heirs and the estate of Jewish art dealer Walter
Westfeld, after determining that a 17th-Century Dutch painting in its collection,
Portrait of a Man and a Woman in an Interior by Eglon van der Neer (c. 1665-
67) had been owned by Westfeld and probably sold under duress. The Museum
233. Press Release, N.Y. Holocaust Claims Processing Office, supra note
230.
234. See Press Release, Museum of Fine Arts, Bos., supra note 193.
235. See Clark & Jacobs, supra note 186 at 260.
236. See Boehm, supra note 196.
237. Clark & Jacobs, Litigation Update, supra note 186 at 259.
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posted an image of the painting online in 2000 to highlight uncertainties about
its provenance, was contacted by Westfeld's nephew, Fred Westfield, in 2004,
and had since been working with Westfield to understand the painting's
history.238
29.Museum of Fine Arts, Boston, MA (2011): Reached a financial settlement
with the heirs of Jakob and Rosa Oppenheimer, allowing the museum to retain
four seventeenth-century tapestries, which were included in a forced sale in
Berlin in 1935.239
30.Philadelphia Museum of Art, Philadelphia, PA (2011): Reached a
financial settlement with the hears of Jakob and Rosa Oppenheimer, allowing
the museum to retain a seventeenth-century tapestry that had been included in a
forced sale in Berlin in 1935.240
31. Toledo Museum of Art, Toledo, OH (2011): The museum returned a
porcelain sea nymph, centerpiece of an elaborate 3000-piece table service made
for Heinrich von Bruehl, prime minister of Polish King and Saxon Elector
Augustus III, to Friedrich Leopold von Bruehl after it had been discovered that
some of the art that the von Bruehl family had lent to Dresden's museums,
including the porcelain nymph, had been confiscated by the Nazis during
WW11. 241
32.Cummer Museum of Art and Gardens, Jacksonville, FL (2012): In
September 2012, the Cummer Museum returned two porcelain pieces (a teapot
and a coffeepot) to the heirs of Gustav Von Klemperer, with the agreement that
the museum could continue to display the pieces for one year. 242
These varied resolutions underscore our theme that not all
claims are-or should be treated as-equal. Even when faced with
apparently meritorious claims, museums reached agreement with
claimants on a wide-range of outcomes, including simple return,
lending arrangements, purchase agreements, and partial donations
coupled with partial purchase. These outcomes appear to reflect
238. Id. at 259-60.
239. See MUSEUM OF FINE ARTS, Bos., supra note 209 (with further links to
the press release).
240. AAMD OBJECT REGISTRY, supra note 209.
241. Id.
242. See Holly Keris, Cummer Returns Nazi Loot to Family, CUMMER
MUSEUM ARTS & GARDENS BLOG (Oct. 15, 2012)
http://blog.cummer.org/2012/1 0/cummer-returns-nazi-loot-to-family/.
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the different regimes governing museums' conduct-their
fiduciary duties to preserve trust assets, their obligations to
preserve their collections for the public, and also their duties to
investigate restitution claims thoroughly and respond accordingly.
Most important, however, the different outcomes reflect museums'
diligent and good faith assessment of the claims at issue. Where
provenance investigation establishes the merit of the ownership
claim, museums do not hesitate to restitute the work to the heirs of
the original owner, or to work out some other mutually satisfactory
arrangement.243
V. CONCLUSION
The above discussion is essentially an extended response to the
unsupported assertions of a few commentators that museums act
unethically when they litigate or vigorously defend claims for the
restitution of art in their collections that changed hands during the
Nazi era. Such contentions fail to consider museums' fiduciary
obligations and codes of ethics, as well as the policy reasons for
the "technical defenses" some commentators deride. These
structures, as we have seen, require museums to exercise thorough
diligence in their research of restitution claims-but do not require
museums to treat all claims equally. To the contrary, museums'
fiduciary obligations and governing codes of ethics require them to
investigate each restitution claim thoroughly and to act
accordingly, consistent with the fiduciary obligation to preserve
trust assets. Consequently, if a claim appears without merit after
careful research-and some do-a museum can be confident in its
decision to seek to dispose of the claim through litigation. Beyond
this, a broad examination of the resolution of recent Nazi-era
restitution claims refutes any suggestion that museums are
243. The contrast between the large number of voluntary restitutions or
resolutions by museums and the few instances of litigation is even more
dramatic when one considers the fact that, while every instance of a museum
initiating litigation and asserting a time bar will be public, the same is not true
of each instance of voluntary restitution. Such private settlements will not
necessarily come to light, so that there may well be even more examples where
museums have investigated the provenance of a piece and decided that a
negotiated return or other settlement was appropriate.
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frequently and aggressively choosing to litigate restitution claims
and to invoke statutes of limitations. There are only a few such
cases, and they involved very weak restitution claims. When such
circumstances arise, it is entirely appropriate for museums, as
guardians of the public trust, to refuse restitution claims and to
attempt to defeat such claims as expeditiously as possible.
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